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The currency crises of the 1990s shocked investors, academics, inter-
national civil servants, and policy makers alike. Most analysts had missed
the financial weaknesses in Mexico and East Asia, and when the crises
erupted almost every observer was surprised by their intensity.1 This in-
ability to predict major financial collapses is viewed as an embarrassment
of sorts by the economics profession. As a result, during the last few years
macroeconomists in academia, in the multilateral institutions, and in in-
vestment banks have been frantically developing crisis “early warning”
models. These models have focused on a number of variables, including
the level and currency composition of foreign debt, debt maturity, the
weakness of the domestic financial sector, the country’s fiscal position, its
level of international reserves, political instability, and real exchange rate
overvaluation, among others. Interestingly, diﬀerent authors do not seem
to agree on the role played by current account deficits in recent financial
collapses. While some analysts have argued that large current account
deficits have been behind major currency crashes, according to others
the current account has not been overly important in many of these
Sebastian Edwards is the Henry Ford II Professor of International Business Economics at
the Anderson Graduate School of Management at the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA) and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The author thanks Alejandro Jara and Igal Magendzo for excellent assistance and beneﬁted
from discussions with Ed Leamer and James Boughton. The author is also grateful to Alejan-
dro M. Werner and Jeﬀrey A. Frankel for helpful comments.
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Does the Current Account Matter?
Sebastian Edwardsepisodes.2 The view that current account deficits have played a limited
role in recent financial debacles in the emerging nations is clearly pre-
sented by U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, who argued in his
Richard T. Ely lecture that “[t]raditional macroeconomic variables, in the
form of overly inflationary monetary policies, large fiscal deficits, or even
large current account deficits, were present in several cases, but are not
necessary antecedents to crisis in all episodes” (Summers 2000, 7, empha-
sis added).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate in detail the behavior of the
current account in emerging economies, and in particular its role—if any—
in ﬁnancial crises. Models of current account behavior are reviewed, and a
dynamic model of current account sustainability is developed. The empiri-
cal analysis is based on a massive data set that covers over 120 countries
during more than twenty-ﬁve years. Important controversies related to the
current account—including the extent to which current account deﬁcits
crowd out domestic saving—are also analyzed. Throughout the paper I am
interested in whether there is evidence to support the idea that there are
costs involved in running “very large” deﬁcits. Moreover, I investigate the
nature of these potential costs, including whether they are particularly high
in the presence of other types of imbalances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 1.2 I review the
way in which economists’ views on the current account have evolved in the
last twenty-ﬁve years or so. The discussion deals with academic as well as
policy perspectives and includes a review of evolving theoretical models of
current account behavior. The analysis presented in this section shows that
there have been important changes in economists’ views on the subject,
from “deﬁcits matter” to “deﬁcits are irrelevant if the public sector is in
equilibrium,” back to “deﬁcits matter,” to the current dominant view that
“current deﬁcits may matter.” In this section I argue that “equilibrium”
models of frictionless economies are of little help in understanding actual
current account behavior or assessing a country’s degree of vulnerability. In
section 1.3 I focus on models of the current account sustainability that have
recently become popular in ﬁnancial institutions, both private and oﬃcial.
More speciﬁcally, I argue that although these models provide some useful
information about the long-run sustainability of the external sector ac-
counts, they are of limited use in determining if, at a particular moment in
time, a country’s current account deﬁcit is “too large.” In order to illustrate
this point, I develop a simple model of current account behavior that em-
phasizes the role of stock adjustments. In section 1.4 I use a massive data set
to analyze some of the most important aspects of current account behavior
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2. For discussions on the causes behind the crises see, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (1998), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), the essays in Dornbusch (2000), and Ed-
wards (1999).in the world economy during the last quarter century. The discussion deals
with the following issues: (a) the distribution of current account deﬁcits
across countries and regions; (b) the relationship between current account
deﬁcits, domestic saving, and investment; (c) the eﬀects of capital account
liberalization on capital controls on the current account; and (d) the cir-
cumstances surrounding major current account reversals. I investigate, in
particular, how frequent and how costly these reversals have been. In sec-
tion 1.5 I deal with the relationship between current account deﬁcits and ﬁ-
nancial crises. I review the existing evidence and present some new results.
Finally, section 1.6 contains some concluding remarks.
1.2 Evolving Views on the Current Account: 
Models and Policy Implications
In this section I analyze the evolving view on current account deﬁcits, fo-
cusing on theoretical models as well as policy analyses. I show that econo-
mists’ views have changed in important ways during the last twenty-ﬁve
years, and I argue that many of these changes have been the result of im-
portant crisis situations in both the advanced and the emerging nations.
1.2.1 The Early Emphasis on Flows
In the immediate post–World War II period, most discussions on a coun-
try’s external balance were based on the elasticities approach and focused
on ﬂows behavior. Even authors who fully understood that the current ac-
count is equal to income minus expenditure—including Meade (1951), Har-
berger (1950), Laursen and Metzler (1950), Machlup (1943), and Johnson
(1955)—tended to emphasize the relation between relative price changes
and trade ﬂows.3
This emphasis on elasticities and the balance of trade also aﬀected policy
discussions in the developing nations. Indeed, until the mid-1970s, policy
debates in the less developed countries were dominated by the so-called
“elasticities pessimism” view, and most authors focused on whether a de-
valuation would result in an improvement in the country’s external posi-
tion, including its trade and current account balances. Cooper’s (1971a, b)
inﬂuential work on devaluation crisis in the developing nations is a good ex-
ample of this emphasis. In these papers Cooper analyzed the consequences
of twenty-one major devaluations in the developing world in the 1958–69
period, focusing on the eﬀect of these exchange rate adjustments on the real
exchange rate and on the balance of trade. Cooper (1971a) argued that al-
though the relevant elasticities were indeed small, devaluations had, over-
all, been successful in helping to improve the trade and current account bal-
ances in the countries in his sample. In an extension of Cooper’s work,
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3. See, for example, Meade’s (1951) discussion on pages 35–36.Kamin (1988) conﬁrmed the results that, historically, (large) devaluations
tended to improve developing countries’ trade balance.
Authors in the structuralist tradition argued that in the developing na-
tions trade and current account imbalances were “structural” in nature and
severely constrained poorer countries’ ability to grow. According to this
view, however, the solution was not to adjust the country’s peg, but to en-
courage industrialization through import substitution policies. In Latin
America this view was persuasively articulated by Raul Prebisch, the charis-
matic executive secretary of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin
America; in Asia it found its most respected defender in Professor Maha-
lanobis, the father of planning and the architect of India’s Second Five Year
Plan; and in Africa it was made the oﬃcial policy stance with the Lagos
Plan of Action of 1980.
1.2.2 The Current Account as an Intertemporal Phenomenon: 
The Lawson Doctrine and the 1980s Debt Crisis
During the second part of the 1970s, and partially as a result of the oil
price shocks, most countries in the world experienced large swings in their
current account balances. These developments generated signiﬁcant con-
cern among policy makers and analysts and prompted a number of experts
to analyze carefully the determinants of the current account. Perhaps the
most important analytical development during this period was a move away
from trade ﬂows and a renewed and formal emphasis on the intertemporal
dimensions of the current account. The departing point was, of course, very
simple and was based on the recognition of two interrelated facts. First,
from a basic national accounting perspective, the current account is equal
to saving minus investment. Second, since both saving and investment de-
cisions are based on intertemporal factors—such as life cycle considera-
tions and expected returns on investment projects—the current account is
necessarily an intertemporal phenomenon. Sachs (1981) forcefully empha-
sized the intertemporal nature of the current account, arguing that, to the
extent that higher current account deﬁcits reﬂected new investment oppor-
tunities, there was no reason to be concerned about them.
Theoretical Issues
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) have provided a comprehensive review of
modern models of the current account that assume intertemporal opti-
mization on behalf of consumers and ﬁrms. In this type of model, con-
sumption smoothing across periods is one of the fundamental drivers of the
current account. The most powerful insight of the modern approach to the
current account can be expressed in a remarkably simple equation. Assum-
ing a constant world interest rate, equality between the world discount fac-
tor [1/(1   r)] and the representative consumer’s subjective discount factor
24 Sebastian Edwards , and no borrowing constraints, the current account deﬁcit (CAD) can be
written as4
(1) CADt   (Y t ∗ – Yt) – (It ∗ – It) – (Gt – Gt∗),
where Yt, It, and Gt are current output, consumption, and government
spending, respectively. Yt ∗, It ∗, and Gt ∗, on the other hand, are the “perma-
nent” levels of these variables. The permanent value of Y (Yt ∗) is deﬁned as












The sum runs from j   t to inﬁnity. That is, equation (2) deﬁnes the perma-
nent value of Y as the annuity value computed at the constant interest rate
r. The deﬁnitions of It ∗ and Gt ∗ are exactly equivalent to that of Yt ∗ in equa-
tion (2).
According to equation (1), if output falls below its permanent value, (Yt ∗
– Yt)   0, there will be a higher current account deﬁcit. Similarly, if invest-
ment increases above its permanent value, there will be a higher current ac-
count deﬁcit. The reason for this is that new investment projects will be par-
tially ﬁnanced with an increase in foreign borrowing, thus generating a
higher current account deﬁcit. Likewise, an increase in government con-
sumption above Gt∗will result in a higher current account deﬁcit. Although
equation (1) is very simple, it captures the fundamental insights of modern
current account analysis. Moreover, extensions of the model, including the
relaxation of the assumption that the subjective discount factor is equal to
the world discount factor, do not alter its most important implications. If,
however, the constant world interest rate assumption is relaxed, the analysis
becomes somewhat more complicated. In this case, the current account
deﬁcit will be fundamentally aﬀected by the country’s net foreign assets po-
sition and by the relationship between the world interest rate and its “per-
manent” value, rt ∗. With a variable world interest rate, equation (1) becomes
(3) CADt   (Yt ∗ – Yt) – (It ∗ – It) – (Gt – Gt∗) – (rt∗ –  r t)Bt – ξt,
where Bt is the country’s net foreign asset position. If the residents of this
country are net holders of foreign assets, Bt   0 (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
1996). The consumption adjustment factor, ξt, arises from the fact that the
world discount factor is not any longer equal to the consumers’ subjective dis-
count factor. Notice that under most plausible parameter values ξt is rather
small (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1996). An important implication of equation (3)
says that if the country is a net foreign debtor (Bt   0) and the world interest
rate exceeds its permanent level, the current account deﬁcit will be higher.
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4. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, 74). For models that generate similar expressions see, for ex-
ample, Razin and Svensson (1983), Frenkel and Razin (1987), and Edwards (1989).A number of versions of optimizing models of the current account have
appeared in the literature published since 1980. Razin and Svensson (1983),
for example, built an optimizing framework to explore the validity of the
Laursen-Metzler-Harberger condition developed in the 1950s and con-
cluded that the insights from these early models were largely valid in a fully
optimizing, two period, general equilibrium model. Edwards and van Wijn-
bergen (1986) explored the current account implications of alternative
speeds of trade liberalization. They found out that in a framework in which
the country in question faced a borrowing constraint, a gradual liberaliza-
tion of trade was preferred to a cold-turkey approach. Frenkel and Razin
(1987) analyzed the way in which alternative ﬁscal policies aﬀected the cur-
rent account balance through time. Edwards (1989) introduced nontrad-
able goods in an eﬀort to understand the connection between the real ex-
change rate and the current account through time. Sheﬀrin and Woo (1990)
used an annuity framework to develop a number of speciﬁc testable hy-
potheses from the intertemporal framework. Ghosh and Ostry (1995)
tested the intertemporal model using data for a group of developing coun-
tries. They argue that, overall, their results adequately capture the most im-
portant features of modern optimizing models of the current account.
Numerical simulations based on the intertemporal approach sketched
above suggest that a country’s optimal response to negative exogenous
shocks is to run very high current account deﬁcits. These large deﬁcits are,
of course, the mechanism through which the country nationals smooth con-
sumption. An important consequence of this models’ result is that a small
country can accumulate a very large external debt and will have to run a
sizeable trade surplus in the steady state in order to repay it. The problem,
however, is that the external accounts and the external debt ratios implied
by these models are not observed in reality. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), for
example, develop a model of a small open economy with Ak technology
and a constant rate of productivity growth that exceeds world productivity
growth.5 This economy faces a constant world interest rate r and no bor-
rowing constraint. Under a set of plausible parameters, the steady-state
trade surplus is equal to 45 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and
the steady-state ratio of debt to GDP is equal to 15.6Needless to say, neither
of these ﬁgures has been observed in modern economies (on actual distri-
butions of the current account see the discussion in section 1.4 of this pa-
per). Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000) developed an intertemporal
model of a small economy to analyze the eﬀects of lifting capital controls
on the dynamics of the current account. The basic version of their model as-
sumes both tradable and nontradable goods, physical capital, and interna-
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5. “Small” means that the cost of borrowing does not rise with the quantity.
6. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) do not claim that this model is particularly realistic. In fact,
they present its implications to highlight some of the shortcomings of simple intertemporal
models of the current account.tionally traded bonds, and no borrowing constraint. An important feature
of the model—and one that sets it apart from that of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1996) discussed above—is that the rate of technological progress is equal
to that of the rest of the world. The authors calibrate the model for the case
of Spain and ﬁnd that the optimal response to a ﬁnancial reform is to run a
current account deﬁcit that peaks at 60 percent of GDP.7 As the authors
themselves acknowledge, this ﬁgure tends to contradict strongly what is ob-
served in reality. Following the ﬁnancial liberalization reform, Spain’s cur-
rent account deﬁcit peaked at 3.4 percent of GDP.
The fact that these models predict optimal levels of the current account
deﬁcit that are an order of magnitude higher than those observed in the real
world poses an important challenge for economists. A number of authors
have tried to deal with these disturbing results by introducing adjustment
costs and other type of rigidities into the analysis. Blanchard (1983), for ex-
ample, developed a current account model with investment installation
costs to investigate the dynamics of debt and the current account in a small
developing economy, such as that of Brazil. A simulation of this model for
feasible parameter values indicated that a country with Brazil’s character-
istics should accumulate foreign debt in excess of 300 percent of its gross na-
tional product (GNP). Moreover, according to this model, in the steady
state the country in question should run a trade surplus equal to 10 percent
of GDP. Although these numbers are not as extreme as those obtained from
simple models without rigidities, they are quite implausible and are not
usually observed in the real world. Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe
(2000) introduced a series of extensions to their basic model in an eﬀort to
generate more plausible simulation results. They showed that it was not
possible to improve the results by simply imposing a greater degree of cur-
vature into the production possibility frontier. They also show that by as-
suming costly and slow factor mobility across sectors they could generate
current account deﬁcits in their simulation exercises that were more mod-
est, although still very high from a historical perspective. More recently, a
number of authors have developed models with borrowing constraints in an
eﬀort to generate current account paths that are closer to reality.
Policy Interpretations of the Intertemporal Approach
An important policy implication of the intertemporal perspective is that
policy actions that result in higher investment opportunities will necessar-
ily generate a deterioration in the country’s current account. According to
this view, however, this type of worsening of the current account balance
should not be a cause for concern or for policy action. This reasoning led
Sachs (1981, 243) to argue that the rapid increase in the developing coun-
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7. Their analysis is carried out in terms of the trade account balance. In this model there are
no diﬀerences between the trade and current account balances.tries’ foreign debt in the 1978–81 period was not a sign of increased vulner-
ability. It is interesting to quote Sachs extensively:
The manageability of the LDC debt has been the subject of a large liter-
ature in recent years. If my analysis is correct, much of the growth in LDC
debt reﬂects increased in investment and should not pose a problem of re-
payment. The major borrowers have accumulated debt in the context of ris-
ing or stable, but not falling, saving rates. This is particularly true for
Brazil and Mexico....   (Sachs 1981, 243, emphasis added)
This view was also endorsed by Robischek (1981), one of the most senior and
inﬂuential International Monetary Fund (IMF) oﬃcials during the 1970s
and 1980s. Commenting on Chile’s situation in 1981—a time when the coun-
try’s current account deﬁcit surpassed 14 percent of GDP—he argued that,
to the extent that the public sector accounts were under control and that do-
mestic saving was increasing, there was absolutely no reason to worry about
major current account deﬁcits. As it turned out, however, shortly after Ro-
bischek expressed his views, Chile entered into a deep ﬁnancial crisis that
ended with a major devaluation, the bankruptcy of the banking sector, and
a GDP decline of 14 percent (see Edwards and Edwards 1991). The argu-
ment that a large current account deﬁcit is not a cause of concern if the ﬁs-
cal accounts are balanced has been associated with former Chancellor of the
Exchequer Nigel Lawson and has come to be known as Lawson’s Doctrine.
The respected Australian economist Max Corden has possibly been the
most articulate exponent of the intertemporal policy view of the current ac-
count. In the important article “Does the Current Account Matter?” Cor-
den (1994) makes a distinction between the “old” and “new” views on the
current account. According to the former, “a country can run a current ac-
count deﬁcit for a limited period. But no positive deﬁcit is sustainable in-
deﬁnitely” (Corden 1994, 88). The “new” view, on the other hand, makes a
distinction between deﬁcits that are the result of ﬁscal imbalances and those
that respond to private sector decisions. According to the new view, “an in-
crease in the current account deﬁcit that results from a shift in private sec-
tor behavior—a rise in investment or a fall in savings—should not be a mat-
ter of concern at all” (Corden 1994, 92, emphasis added).
The eruption of the debt crisis in 1982 suggested that some of the more
important policy implications of the new (intertemporal) view of the cur-
rent account were subject to important ﬂaws. Indeed, some of the countries
aﬀected by this crisis had run very large current account deﬁcits in the pres-
ence of increasing investment rates or balanced ﬁscal accounts. In that re-
gard, the case of Latin America is quite interesting. With the exception of
oil producer Venezuela, current account deﬁcits skyrocketed in 1981. This
was the case in countries with increasing investment, such as Brazil and
Mexico, as well as in countries with a balanced ﬁscal sector and rising in-
vestment, such as Chile.
28 Sebastian Edwards1.2.3 Views on the Current Account in the Post-1982 Debt Crisis Period
In light of the debt crisis of 1982, a number of authors explicitly moved
away from the implications of the Lawson Doctrine and argued that large
current account deﬁcits were often a sign of trouble to come, even if do-
mestic savings were high and increasing. Fischer (1988) made this point
forcefully in an article on real exchange rate overvaluation and currency
crises: “The primary indicator [of a looming crisis] is the current account
deﬁcit. Large actual or projected current account deﬁcits—or, for countries
that have to make heavy debt repayments, insuﬃciently large surpluses—
are a call for devaluation” (115). An important point raised by Fischer was
that what matters is not whether there is a large deﬁcit, but whether the
country in question is running an “unsustainable” deﬁcit. In his words, “if
the current account deﬁcit is ‘unsustainable’ . . . or if reasonable forecasts
show that it will be unsustainable in the future, devaluation will be neces-
sary sooner or later” (115). In the aftermath of the 1990s crises, (as will be
discussed in section 1.3 of this paper) the issue of current account sustain-
ability moved decisively to the center of the policy debate. In the years im-
mediately following the 1982 debt crisis, Cline (1988) also emphasized the
importance of current account deﬁcits, as did Kamin (1988), whose exten-
sive empirical work suggested that the trade and current accounts “deteri-
orated steadily through the year immediately prior to devaluation” (14). In
their analysis of the Chilean crisis of 1982, Edwards and Edwards (1991) ar-
gued that Chile’s experience—in which a 14 percent current account deﬁcit
was generated by private-sector–induced capital inﬂows—showed that the
Lawson Doctrine was seriously ﬂawed.
1.2.4 The Surge of Capital Inﬂows in the 1990s, 
the Current Account, and the Mexican Crisis
During much of the 1980s the majority of the developing countries were
cut oﬀ from the international capital markets, and either ran current ac-
count surpluses or small deﬁcits. This was even the case for the so-called
East Asian Tigers, which had not been aﬀected by the debt crisis. Indeed,
between 1982 and 1990 Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore posted current
account surpluses, while Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land ran moderate deﬁcits. Indonesia’s and Thailand’s deﬁcits were the
highest in the group, averaging 3.2 percent of GDP.
Starting in 1990, however, a large number of emerging countries were able
once again to attract private capital. This was particularly the case in Latin
America, where by 1992 the net volume of funds had become so large—ex-
ceeding 35 percent of the region’s exports—that a number of analysts be-
gan to talk about Latin America’s “capital inﬂows problem” (Calvo, Lei-
derman, and Reinhart 1993; Edwards 1993). Naturally, the counterpart of
these large capital inﬂows was a signiﬁcant widening in capital account
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ﬁrst half of the 1990s, and in the midst of international capital abundance,
there was a resurgence of Lawson’s Doctrine in some policy circles. This was
particularly the case in analyses of the evolution of the Mexican economy
during the years preceding the peso crisis of 1994–95. In 1990 the interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets rediscovered Mexico, and large amounts of capital
began ﬂowing into the country. As a result, Mexico could ﬁnance signiﬁ-
cant current account deﬁcits—in 1992–94 they averaged almost 7 percent
of GDP. When some analysts pointed out that these deﬁcits were very large,
the Mexican authorities responded by arguing that, since the ﬁscal ac-
counts were under control, there was no reason to worry. In 1993 the Bank
of Mexico maintained that “the current account deﬁcit has been deter-
mined exclusively by the private sector’s decisions....  B e c ause of the above
and the solid position of public ﬁnances, the current account deﬁcit should
clearly not be a cause for undue concern” (179–80, emphasis added). In his
recently published memoirs, former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
(2000) argues that the very large current account deﬁcit was not a cause of
the December 1994 crisis. According to him, two of the most inﬂuential
cabinet members—Secretary of Commerce Jaime Serra and Secretary of
Programming, and future president, Ernesto Zedillo—pointed out in the
early 1990s that, since the public sector was in equilibrium, Mexico’s large
current account deﬁcit was harmless.8
Not everyone, however, agreed with this position. In the 1994 Brookings
Panel session on Mexico, Stanley Fischer argued that
[t]he Mexican current account deﬁcit is huge, and it is being ﬁnanced
largely by portfolio investment. Those investments can turn around very
quickly and leave Mexico with no choice but to devalue . . . [a]nd as the
European and especially the Swedish experiences show, there may be no
interest rate high enough to prevent an outﬂow and a forced devaluation.
(1994, 306)
The World Bank staﬀ expressed concern about the widening current ac-
count deﬁcit. In Trends in Developing Economies 1993,the Bank staﬀwrote:
“In 1992 about two-thirds of the widening of the current account deﬁcit can
be ascribed to lower private savings....  I f  this trend continues, it could re-
new fears about Mexico’s inability to generate enough foreign exchange to
service debt” (World Bank 1993, 330).
1.2.5 Views on the Current Account in the Post-1990s Currency Crashes
In the aftermath of the Mexican crisis of 1994, a large number of analysts
maintained, once again, that Lawson’s Doctrine was seriously ﬂawed. In an
address to the Board of Governors of the Interamerican Development
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8. See Salinas de Gortari (2000), pages 1091–94.Bank, Lawrence Summers (1996), then the U.S. deputy secretary of the
treasury, was extremely explicit when he said, “current account deﬁcits can-
not be assumed to be benign because the private sector generated them”
(46). This position was also taken by the IMF in postmortems of the Mex-
ican debacle. In evaluating the role of the fund during the Mexican crisis,
the director of the Western Hemisphere department and the chief of the
Mexico division wrote: “[L]arge current account deﬁcits, regardless of the
factors underlying them[,] are likely to be unsustainable (Loser and Wil-
liams 1997, 268). According to Secretary Summers, “close attention should
be paid to any current account deﬁcit in excess of 5 percent of GDP, partic-
ularly if it is ﬁnanced in a way that could lead to rapid reversals.”
Whether “large” current account deﬁcits were in fact a central cause of
the East Asian debacle continues to be a somewhat controversial issue. Us-
ing the available evidence, in a recent comprehensive study Corsetti, Pe-
senti, and Roubini (1998) analyze the period leading to the East Asian cri-
sis and argue that there is some support for the position that large current
account deﬁcits were one of the principal factors behind the crisis. Accord-
ing to them, “as a group, the countries that came under attack in 1997 appear
to have been those with large current account deﬁcits throughout the 1990s”
(7, emphasis in the original). They then add in a rather guarded way, “prima
facie evidence suggests that current account problems may have played a
role in the dynamics of the Asian meltdown” (8). Radelet and Sachs (2000)
have also argued that large current account deﬁcits were an important fac-
tor leading to the crisis. Additionally, commenting on the eruption of the
crisis in Thailand, the Chase Manhattan Bank (1997) argued that large cur-
rent account deﬁcits had been a basic cause of the crises. A close analysis of
the data shows, however, that with the exceptions of Malaysia and Thailand
the current account deﬁcits were not very large. Take, for instance, the
1990–96 period: for the ﬁve East Asia crisis countries, the deﬁcit exceeded
the arbitrary 5 percent threshold only twelve out of thirty-ﬁve possible
times. The frequency of occurrence is even lower for the two years preced-
ing the crisis, at three out of ten possible times (Edwards 1999).
In view of the (perceived) limited importance of the current account,
many authors have developed crisis models in which the current account
deﬁcit is not central. In Calvo (2000), for example, a currency crisis re-
sponds to ﬁnancial fragilities in the country in question and is independent
of the current account. A particularly important fragility is the mismatch
between the maturity of banks’ assets and obligations. Chang and Velasco
(2000) have developed a series of models in which a crisis is the result of
self-fulﬁlling expectations. A somewhat diﬀerent line of research has em-
phasized the role of borrowing constraints. In this setting, the nationals of
the country in question cannot borrow as much as they wish from the in-
ternational ﬁnancial market; an upward-sloping supply for foreign funds
limits their ability to smooth consumption. An appealing feature of this
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implausible values generated by the small country models discussed above.
Moreover, in borrowing constraints models, changes in the level of the bor-
rowing constraint—generated by changes in the lender’s expectations, for
example—can indeed result in currency crises. A good example is Atkeson
and Rios-Rull’s (1996) model of a credit-constrained country. In this set-
ting, current account problems may arise even if ﬁscal and monetary poli-
cies are consistent; a change in investors’ perceptions is all that is neces-
sary.
An important consequence of the 1990s currency crashes was that mar-
ket participants, and in particular private investors, became concerned with
the evolution of emerging nations’ current account balances. This concern
has been translated into formal eﬀorts to develop models of current ac-
count “sustainability.” The issue at hand has been succinctly put by Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (1996): “What persistent level of current account deﬁcits
should be considered sustainable? Conventional wisdom is that current ac-
count deﬁcits above 5% of GDP ﬂash a red light, in particular if the deﬁcit
is ﬁnanced with short-term debt.”
1.3 How Useful are Models of Current Account Sustainability?
As mentioned in the preceding section, in the aftermath of the Mexican
crisis many analysts argued that the so-called “new” view of the current ac-
count, based on Lawson’s Doctrine, was seriously ﬂawed. While some, such
as Bruno (1995), argued that large deﬁcits stemming from higher invest-
ment (as in East Asia) were not particularly dangerous, others maintained
that any deﬁcit in excess of a certain threshold—say, 4 percent of GDP—
was a cause for concern. Partially motivated by this debate, Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (1996) developed a framework to analyze current account sus-
tainability. Their main point was that the “sustainable” level of the current
account was that level consistent with solvency. This, in turn, means the
level at which “the ratio of external debt to GDP is stabilized” (Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin 1998). Analyses of current account sustainability have
become particularly popular among investment banks. For instance, Gold-
man Sachs’s GS-SCAD model developed in 1997 has become popular
among analysts interested in assessing emerging nations’ vulnerability.
More recently, Deutsche Bank (2000) has developed a model of current ac-
count sustainability both to analyze whether a particular country’s current
account is “out of line” and to evaluate the appropriateness of its real ex-
change rate.
The basic idea behind sustainability exercises is captured by the follow-
ing simple analysis. As pointed out, solvency requires that the ratio of the
(net) international demand for the country’s liabilities (both debt and non-
debt liabilities) stabilize at a level compatible with foreigners’ net demand
32 Sebastian Edwardsfor these claims on future income ﬂows. Under standard portfolio theory,
the net international demand for country j’s liabilities can be written as
(4) δj    j(W – W j) – (1 –  jj)W j,
where  jis the percentage of world’s wealth (W) that international investors
are willing to hold in the form of country j’s assets; W j is country j’s wealth
(broadly deﬁned), and  jj is country j’s asset allocation on its own assets.
The asset allocation shares  jand  jjdepend, as in standard portfolio analy-
ses, on expected returns and perceived risk. Assuming that country’s j
wealth is a multiple λ of its (potential or full employment) GDP, and that
country’s j wealth is a fraction  j of world’s wealth W, it is possible to write
the (international) net demand for country’s j assets as9
(5) δj   [ j θj – (1 –  jj)]λjjY j,
where Y j is (potential) GDP, and θj   (1 –  j)/ j. Denoting {[ j θj – (1 –
 jj)]λjj}   γj∗, then,
(6) δj   γj∗Y j.
Equation (6) simply states that, in long-run equilibrium, the net interna-
tional demand for country j’s assets can be expressed as a proportion γj∗ of
the country’s (potential or sustainable) GDP. The determinants of the fac-
tor of proportionality are given by equation (3) and, as expressed, include
relative returns and perceived risk of country j and other countries.10
In this framework, and under the simplifying assumption that interna-
tional reserves don’t change, the “sustainable” current account ratio is
given by11
(7) (C/Y)j   (gj    j∗) {[ j θj – (1 –  jj)] λjj},
where gj is the country’s sustainable rate of growth, and  j∗ is a valuation
factor (approximately) equal to international inﬂation.12Notice that if [ jθj
– (1 –  jj)]   0, domestic residents’ demand for foreign liabilities exceeds
foreigners’ demand for the country’s liabilities. Under these circumstances,
the country will have to run a current account surplus in order to maintain
a stable (net external) liabilities-to-GDP ratio. Notice that according to
equation (4) there is no reason for the “sustainable” current account deﬁcit
to be the same across countries. In fact, that would only happen by sheer co-
incidence. The main message of equation (4) is that “sustainable” current
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9. This expression will hold for every period t; I have omitted the subscript tin order to econ-
omize on notation.
10. The assumptions of constant λ and θ are, of course, highly simplifying.
11. As a result of this assumption, equation (6) overstates (slightly) the “sustainable” cur-
rent account ratio.
12. Under the restrictive assumption that international inﬂation is equal to zero, this ex-
pression corresponds exactly to Goldman Sachs’s equation (8). See Ades and Kaune (1997, 6).34 Sebastian Edwards





























account balances vary across countries and depend on whatever variables
aﬀect portfolio decisions and economic growth. In other words, the notion
that no country can run a sustainable deﬁcit in excess of 4 or 5 percent of
GDP, or any other arbitrary number, is nonsense.
Using a very similar framework to the one developed above, Goldman
Sachs has made a serious eﬀort to actually estimate long-run sustainable
current account deﬁcits for a number of countries (Ades and Kaune 1997).
Using a twenty-ﬁve-country data set, Goldman Sachs estimated the ratio of
external liabilities foreigners are willing to hold—γj∗ in the model sketched
above—as well as each country’s potential rate of growth. Table 1.1 con-
tains Goldman Sachs’s estimates of γj∗, while table 1.2 presents their es-
timates of long-run sustainable current account deficits. In addition to
estimating these steady-state imbalances, Goldman Sachs calculated
asymptotic convergence paths toward those long-run current accounts.
These are presented in table 1.2 under short-run sustainable balances. Sev-
eral interesting features emerge from these tables. First, there is a wide vari-ety of estimated long-run “sustainable” deﬁcits. Second, with the notable ex-
ception of China—whose estimated “sustainable” deﬁcit is an improbable
11 percent of GDP—the estimated levels are very modest, ranging from 1.9
to 4.5 percent of GDP. Third, although the range for the short-run sustain-
able level is broader, in very few countries does it exceed 4 percent of GDP.
Fourth, the estimates of the ratio of the external liabilities foreigners are
willing to hold for each country—γj∗ in the model sketched above—exhibit
more variability. Here the range (excluding China) goes from 31.5 to 64.6
percent of GDP.
Although this type of analysis represents an improvement with respect to
arbitrary current account thresholds, it is subject to a number of serious
limitations, including the fact that it is exceedingly diﬃcult to obtain reli-
able estimates for the key variables. In particular, there is very little evidence
on equilibrium portfolio shares. Also, the underlying models used for cal-
culating the long-run growth tend to be very simplistic.
The most serious limitation of this framework, however, is that it does not
take into account, in a satisfactory way, transitional issues arising from
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Table 1.2 Sustainable Current Account Deﬁcit (SCAD) (% of GDP)
Country 1997 CAD SCAD Steady-State SCAD
Argentina 2.7 3.9 2.9
Brazil 4.5 2.9 1.9
Bulgaria –2.6 0.4 2.4
Chile 3.7 4.2 2.9
China –1.4 12.9 11.1
Colombia 4.8 2.6 1.9
Czech Republic 8.6 2.1 1.3
Ecuador 2.0 –0.5 1.3
Hungary 4.0 0.8 1.3
India 1.8 3.8 2.8
Indonesia 3.0 4.0 3.4
Korea 3.8 4.9 3.6
Malaysia 4.1 4.9 3.4
Mexico 1.7 2.1 1.9
Morocco 1.8 0.3 1.3
Panama 6.1 0.8 1.9
Peru 5.1 3.3 2.9
The Philippines 4.2 4.5 3.8
Poland 3.8 4.7 3.6
Romania 0.5 2.3 1.9
Russia –2.8 2.5 1.9
South Africa 1.8 3.0 1.9
Thailand 5.4 6.0 4.5
Turkey 1.2 2.1 1.9
Venezuela –4.6 2.2 1.9
Source: Goldman Sachs.changes in portfolio allocations. These can have a fundamental eﬀect on the
way in which the economy adjusts to changes in the external environment.
For example, the speed at which a country absorbs surges in foreigners’ de-
mand for its liabilities will have an eﬀect on the sustainable path of the cur-
rent account (Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2000).
The key point is that even small changes in foreigners’ net demand for the
country’s liabilities may generate complex equilibrium adjustment paths for
the current account. These current account movements will be necessary
for the new portfolio allocation to materialize and will not generate a dise-
quilibrium, or unsustainable balance. However, when this equilibrium path
of the current account is contrasted with threshold levels obtained from
models, such as the one sketched above, analysts could (incorrectly) con-
clude that the country is facing a serious disequilibrium.
In order to illustrate this point, assume that equation (8) captures the way
in which the current account responds to change in portfolio allocations. In
this equation, γt ∗ is the new desired level (relative to GDP) of foreigners’
(net) desired holdings of the country’s liabilities; γ∗
t–1, on the other hand, is
the old desired level.
(8) (C/Y)t   (g   ∗) γt ∗    (γt ∗ – γ∗
t–1) – η[(C/Y)t–1 – (g    ∗) γt ∗],
where, as before, γ∗   {[ j θj – (1 –  jj)]λjj}. According to this equation,
short-term deviations of the current account from its long-run level can re-
sult from two forces. The ﬁrst is a traditional stock adjustment term, (γt ∗ –
γ∗
t–1), that captures deviations between the demanded and the actual stock of
assets. If γt ∗   γ∗
t–1, then the current account deﬁcit will exceed its long-run
value. The speed of adjustment,  , will depend on a number of factors, in-
cluding the degree of capital mobility in the country in question and the ma-
turity of its foreign debt. The second force, which is captured by –η[(C/Y)t–1
– (g    ∗) γt ∗] in equation (7), is a self-correcting term. This term plays the
role of making sure that in this economy there is some form of “consump-
tion smoothing.” The importance of this self-correcting term will depend on
the value of η. If η 0, the self-correcting term will play no role, and the dy-
namics of the current account will be given by a more traditional stock ad-
justment equation. In the more general case, however, when both  and ηare
diﬀerent from zero, the dynamics of the current account will be richer, and
discrepancies between γ t ∗ and γ∗
t–1 will be resolved gradually through time.
As may be seen from equation (8), in the long-run steady state, when (γt ∗
 γ∗
t–1) and (CY)t–1  C/Y, the current account will be at its sustainable level,
(g  ∗) {[ jθj– (1 –  jj)] λjj}. The dynamic behavior for the net stock of the
country’s assets in the hands of foreigners, as a percentage of GDP, will be
given by equation (9).














36 Sebastian EdwardsThe implications of incorporating the adjustment process can be illus-
trated with a simple example based on the Goldman Sachs computations
presented above. Notice that according to the ﬁgures in table 1.1, by the end
of 1996 there was a signiﬁcant gap between Goldman Sachs’s estimates of
foreigners’ desired holdings of Mexican and Argentine liabilities: Although
the Mexican ratio stood at 38.3 percent of the country’s GDP, the corre-
sponding ﬁgure for Argentina was 48.4 percent. Assume that for some rea-
son—a reduction in perceived Mexican country risk, for example—this
gap is closed to one-half of its initial level and that the demand for Mexican
liabilities increases to 43 percent of Mexican GDP. Figure 1.1 presents the
estimated evolution of the sustainable current account path under the as-
sumptions that Mexican growth remains at 5 percent and that world inﬂa-
tion is zero—both assumptions made by Goldman Sachs. In addition, it is
assumed that   0.65, η   0.45, and that the increase in γ∗ is spread over
three years.
The results from this simple exercise are quite interesting: First, as may
be seen, the initial level of the sustainable current account level is equal to
1.9 percent of GDP, exactly the level estimated by Goldman Sachs (see table
1.2). Second, the current account converges to 2.15 percent of GDP, as sug-
gested by equation (7). Third, and more important for the analysis in this
section, the dynamic of the current account is characterized by a sizable
overshooting, with the “equilibrium path” deﬁcit peaking at 3.5 percent of
GDP. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the increase in γ∗ takes place
in one period, the equilibrium deﬁcit would peak at a level in excess of 5 per-
cent, a ﬁgure twice as large as the new long-term sustainable level. What
makes this exercise particularly interesting is that these rather large over-
shootings are the result of very small changes in portfolio preferences. This
strongly suggests that in a world where desired portfolio shares are con-
stantly changing, the concept of a sustainable equilibrium current account
path is very diﬃcult to estimate. Moreover, this simple exercise indicates
that relying on current account ratios—even ratios calculated using current
“sustainability” frameworks—can be highly misleading. These dynamic
features of current account adjustment may explain why so many authors
have failed to ﬁnd a direct connection between current account deﬁcits and
crises.
The analysis presented above suggests two important dimensions of ad-
justment and crisis prevention. First, current account dynamics will aﬀect
real exchange rate behavior. More speciﬁcally, current account overshoot-
ing will be associated with a temporary real exchange rate appreciation. The
actual magnitude of this appreciation will depend on a number of variables,
including the income demand elasticity for nontradables and the labor in-
tensity of the nontradable sector. In order for this dynamic adjustment to
be smooth, the country should have the ability to implement the required
real exchange rate depreciation in the second phase of the process. This is
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Fig. 1.1 On the equilibrium path of the current account deﬁcit: A simulation exercise;
A, Assumed evolution of foreigners’ net demand for Mexico’s liabilities; B, Simulated
equilibrium path of Mexico’s current account deﬁcitlikely to be easier under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime than under a rigid
one. Second, if foreigners’ (net) demand for the country’s liabilities de-
clines—as is likely to be the case if there is some degree of contagion, for ex-
ample—the required current account compression will also overshoot. In
the immediate future the country will have to go through a very severe ad-
justment. This can be illustrated by the following simple example. Assume
that as a result of external events—a crisis in Brazil, say—the demand for
Argentine liabilities declines from the level estimated by Goldman Sachs,
48.4 percent of GDP, to 40 percent of GDP. While the long-run equilibrium
current account, as calculated by Goldman Sachs, would experience a very
modest decline from 2.9 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP, in the short run the
adjustment would be drastic. In fact, the simple model developed above
suggests that after two years the deﬁcit would have to be compressed to ap-
proximately 0.5 percent of GDP.13
1.4 Current Account Behavior Since the 1970s
In this section I provide a broad analysis of current account behavior in
both emerging and advanced countries. The section deals with three spe-
ciﬁc issues: (1) the distribution of the current account across regions, (2) the
persistence of high current account deﬁcits, and (3), a detailed analysis of
current account reversals and their costs. The discussion of the relationship,
if any, between current account deﬁcits and ﬁnancial crises is the subject of
section 1.5.
1.4.1 The Distribution of Current Account Deﬁcits 
in the World Economy
In this subsection I use data for 149 countries during 1970–97 to analyze
some basic aspects of current account behavior. I am particularly interested
in understanding the magnitudes of deﬁcits through time. This ﬁrst look at
the data should help answer questions such as “From a historical point of
view, is 4 percent of GDP a large current account deﬁcit?” and “Historically,
for how long have countries been able to run ‘large’ current account
deﬁcits?” The data are from the World Bank comparative data set. However,
when data taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics are used,
the results obtained are very similar. Throughout the analysis I have con-
centrated on the current account deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP; that is, in
what follows, a positive number means that the country in question, for that
particular year, has run a current account deﬁcit. In order to organize the dis-
cussion I have divided the data into six regions: (1) industrialized countries,
(2) Latin America and the Caribbean, (3) Asia, (4) Africa, (5) the Middle
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13. This assumes that growth is not aﬀected. If, as is likely, it declines, the required com-
pression would be even larger.East and Northern Africa, and (6) Eastern Europe. In table 1.3 I present the
number of countries in each region and year for which data are available.
This table summarizes the largest data set that can be used in empirical work.
As will be speciﬁed later, in some of the empirical exercises I have restricted
the data set to countries with populations above half a million people and in-
come per capita above US$500 in 1985 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.
For a list of the countries included in the analysis, see the appendix.
Tables 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 contain basic data on current account deﬁcits by
region for the period 1970–97. In table 1.4 I present averages by region and
year. Table 1.5 contains medians, and in table 1.6 I present the 3rd quartile
by year and region. I have used the data on the 3rd quartile presented in this
table as cutoﬀ points to deﬁne “high deﬁcit” countries. Later in this section
I analyze the persistence of high deﬁcits in each of the six regions.
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Table 1.3 Number of Observations per Region Used in Current Account Analysis
Latin Middle Eastern
Year Industrialized America Asia Africa East Europe Total
1970 8 5 5 2 2 0 22
1971 9 6 5 2 3 0 25
1972 10 6 6 2 3 0 27
1973 10 6 6 2 3 0 27
1974 11 7 7 10 4 1 40
1975 18 10 9 18 5 1 61
1976 20 17 10 23 8 1 79
1977 22 25 11 32 9 1 100
1978 22 27 11 36 9 1 106
1979 21 29 12 37 9 1 109
1980 21 32 13 40 10 3 119
1981 22 32 15 41 10 3 123
1982 22 32 15 42 10 4 125
1983 22 32 15 42 10 4 125
1984 22 33 17 42 10 5 129
1985 22 33 17 44 10 5 131
1986 22 31 17 45 10 5 130
1987 22 32 17 47 10 6 134
1988 22 32 17 47 10 6 134
1989 22 32 17 47 10 6 134
1990 22 32 17 46 11 6 134
1991 23 32 17 45 10 7 134
1992 23 33 18 44 10 13 141
1993 23 33 18 44 10 18 146
1994 23 33 18 44 11 20 149
1995 23 31 18 36 11 20 139
1996 23 26 18 28 7 21 123
1997 20 17 18 22 7 19 103
Total 550 696 384 910 232 177 2,949
Source: Author’s calculations.A number of interesting features of current account behavior emerge
from these tables. First, after the 1973 oil shock, there were important
changes in current account balances in the industrial nations, the Middle
East, and Africa. Interestingly, no discernible change can be detected in
Latin America or Asia. Second, and in contrast to the previous point, the
1979 oil shock seems to have aﬀected current account balances in every re-
gion in the world. The impact of this shock was particularly severe in Latin
America, where the deﬁcit jumped from an average of 3.4 percent of GDP
in 1978 to over 10 percent of GDP in 1981. Third, these tables capture
vividly the magnitude of the external adjustment undertaken by the emerg-
ing economies in the 1980s. What is particularly interesting is that, contrary
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Table 1.4 Average Current Account to GDP Deﬁcit Ratios, by Region, 1970–97
Latin Middle Eastern
Year Industrialized America Asia Africa East Europe Total
1970 –0.02 7.59 –0.52 0.92 7.86 n.a. 2.40
1971 –0.28 5.59 0.08 5.25 –0.13 n.a. 1.66
1972 –1.54 3.86 1.80 6.16 –4.39 n.a. 0.66
1973 –1.18 3.40 0.53 7.18 0.61 n.a. 1.04
1974 3.00 3.30 3.55 –3.22 –10.14 1.50 0.24
1975 1.49 2.44 2.02 4.72 –9.52 3.52 1.81
1976 2.20 1.42 0.81 5.70 –10.59 3.81 1.60
1977 1.86 4.09 0.90 3.77 –5.88 5.15 2.26
1978 0.52 3.39 2.82 8.62 0.77 1.88 4.28
1979 1.43 4.28 3.54 6.51 –8.18 1.54 3.35
1980 2.22 7.13 9.40 7.12 –9.02 2.06 5.02
1981 2.47 10.15 10.15 10.68 –8.00 3.17 7.30
1982 2.41 9.09 9.94 12.38 –1.67 1.46 8.02
1983 1.24 6.39 9.52 8.76 1.61 1.47 6.11
1984 0.99 4.16 5.83 6.19 1.32 0.40 4.14
1985 1.17 2.72 4.67 6.44 1.45 1.54 3.82
1986 0.98 5.44 3.60 6.60 1.30 2.80 4.43
1987 1.04 5.37 2.24 4.75 1.25 0.17 3.51
1988 0.91 4.28 1.65 5.80 0.54 –1.05 3.41
1989 1.20 5.28 2.85 4.64 –2.99 0.33 3.24
1990 1.18 4.59 2.31 4.51 –4.73 2.96 2.88
1991 0.68 7.19 2.56 4.79 n.a. 1.78 6.26
1992 0.44 5.47 2.33 6.31 7.90 –0.14 4.17
1993 –0.45 5.89 5.10 6.75 5.64 1.26 4.46
1994 –0.35 4.65 3.38 6.47 –0.31 0.91 3.39
1995 –0.32 4.43 5.07 8.00 –1.63 2.59 3.91
1996 –0.44 5.29 4.33 8.51 –2.60 6.45 4.56
1997 –0.66 3.87 3.79 4.57 –3.89 6.51 3.09
Total 0.87 5.28 4.12 6.56 –0.40 2.52 4.09
Source: Computed by the author using raw data obtained from the World Bank.
Note: A positive number denotes a current account deﬁcit. A negative number represents a surplus. 
n.a. = not available.to popular folklore, this adjustment was not conﬁned to the Latin Ameri-
can region. Indeed, the nations of Asia and Africa also experienced severe
reductions in their deﬁcits during this period. Fourth, the industrialized
countries regained sustained surpluses only after 1993. Finally, during the
most recent period, current account deﬁcits have been rather modest from
a historical perspective. This has been the case in every region, with the im-
portant exception of Eastern Europe.
The data on 3rd quartiles presented in table 1.6 show that 25 percent of
the countries in our sample had, at one point or another, a current account
deﬁcit in excess of 7.22 percent of GDP. Naturally, as the table shows, the
3rd quartile diﬀers for each region and year, with the largest values corre-
sponding to Africa and Latin America. I use the 3rd-quartile data in table
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Table 1.5 Median Current Account to GDP Deﬁcit Ratios, by Region, 1970–97
Latin Middle Eastern
Year Industrialized America Asia Africa East Europe Total
1970 –0.41 4.06 0.94 0.92 7.86 n.a. 0.86
1971 –0.51 4.83 1.10 5.25 5.74 n.a. 1.08
1972 –1.06 1.70 1.57 6.16 2.88 n.a. 0.44
1973 0.18 1.24 0.77 7.18 5.42 n.a. 0.95
1974 2.94 4.10 3.02 2.39 0.14 1.50 2.97
1975 1.34 4.52 3.23 6.56 –2.73 3.52 3.40
1976 2.71 1.41 0.62 5.00 –6.65 3.81 3.27
1977 2.11 3.80 –0.03 4.24 –3.71 5.15 2.84
1978 0.68 3.48 2.74 9.95 3.01 1.88 3.60
1979 0.66 4.68 3.73 6.52 –8.89 1.54 3.32
1980 2.35 5.59 5.03 8.36 –3.96 4.95 4.66
1981 2.73 9.06 5.92 10.09 1.46 2.72 6.58
1982 2.02 7.60 5.10 9.85 –1.53 1.88 6.41
1983 0.88 4.70 7.18 6.59 5.10 1.48 4.33
1984 0.22 3.66 2.12 3.76 4.89 1.43 2.51
1985 0.98 2.07 3.13 4.42 2.61 1.51 2.91
1986 –0.12 2.99 2.42 3.76 2.30 1.93 2.68
1987 0.42 4.15 1.34 5.22 3.04 0.76 2.61
1988 1.15 2.25 2.68 5.50 2.00 0.72 2.66
1989 1.54 4.41 3.35 3.76 –0.39 1.70 2.85
1990 1.60 3.00 3.41 3.78 –0.58 3.69 2.83
1991 0.91 4.83 3.17 3.64 9.74 0.70 3.02
1992 0.86 4.34 1.94 5.65 7.29 0.40 3.01
1993 0.55 4.60 4.18 6.81 4.20 1.58 3.18
1994 –0.37 3.19 4.63 5.65 –0.38 1.39 2.49
1995 –0.71 3.90 4.91 4.81 –2.14 1.99 2.70
1996 –0.56 3.97 4.76 4.15 –0.99 4.50 3.28
1997 –0.57 4.12 3.61 3.71 –2.39 6.29 2.94
Total 0.77 4.12 3.14 5.33 1.95 1.93 3.17
Source: Computed by the author using raw data obtained from the World Bank.
Note: n.a. = not available1.6 to deﬁne “large current account deﬁcit” countries. In particular, if dur-
ing a given year a particular country’s deﬁcit exceeds its region’s 3rd quar-
tile, I classify it as being a “high-deﬁcit country.”14 An important policy
question is how persistent high deﬁcits are. I deal with this issue intable 1.7,
where I have listed those countries that have had a “high current account
deﬁcit” for at least ﬁve years in a row. The results are quite interesting and
indicate that a rather small number of countries experienced very long pe-
riods of high deﬁcits. In fact, I could detect only eleven countries with high
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Table 1.6 Third Quartile of Current Account to GDP Deﬁcit Ratios, by Region, 1970–97
Latin Middle Eastern
Year Industrialized America Asia Africa East Europe Total
1970 0.64 6.86 1.28 1.93 9.85 n.a. 4.06
1971 0.43 7.77 1.74 8.28 9.31 n.a. 4.55
1972 0.30 2.37 3.63 11.96 5.30 n.a. 2.59
1973 1.33 4.12 1.30 9.99 5.81 n.a. 4.12
1974 4.41 10.05 5.61 4.64 14.44 1.50 5.52
1975 4.46 6.78 5.06 8.44 13.98 3.52 7.75
1976 4.38 4.23 6.19 8.80 4.36 3.81 5.47
1977 3.62 7.37 4.49 7.86 2.47 5.15 6.35
1978 2.50 7.07 4.80 12.85 9.17 1.88 9.17
1979 2.76 6.60 6.57 12.30 5.17 1.54 7.62
1980 3.70 12.92 8.46 13.11 2.63 5.99 10.60
1981 4.32 15.06 10.04 12.85 5.85 7.38 11.76
1982 4.05 11.74 11.49 14.48 8.26 2.63 10.57
1983 2.41 8.33 9.01 12.39 7.73 2.61 8.33
1984 3.08 6.56 4.88 8.78 8.17 1.46 5.69
1985 3.75 6.05 4.82 9.68 7.45 1.85 6.42
1986 3.51 7.75 5.16 8.19 9.36 4.69 6.44
1987 3.24 8.79 4.07 9.69 6.35 2.53 6.35
1988 3.03 7.67 4.30 9.49 4.65 1.75 6.51
1989 3.60 7.61 5.91 7.02 5.43 2.02 5.69
1990 3.37 7.64 6.08 8.93 2.77 8.25 6.13
1991 2.78 11.57 6.61 9.05 17.96 3.51 7.57
1992 2.67 8.04 4.70 9.01 15.72 3.68 6.86
1993 1.65 8.81 6.42 8.80 11.45 4.45 7.86
1994 1.83 7.27 6.46 8.88 6.62 3.57 6.50
1995 1.64 5.42 8.06 10.42 4.24 5.54 6.61
1996 1.83 7.02 8.10 9.25 3.32 9.16 7.60
1997 1.91 5.93 6.89 7.05 2.94 11.07 6.29
1998
Total 3.06 8.16 6.37 10.09 7.14 4.84 7.22
Source: Computed by the author using raw data obtained from the World Bank.
Note: n.a. = not available
14. Notice, however, that the actual cutoﬀ points correspond to fairly large deﬁcits even for
the Middle Eastern countries.deﬁcits for ten or more years. Of these, ﬁve are in Africa, three are in Asia,
and, perhaps surprisingly, only two are in Latin America and the Carib-
bean. Interestingly enough, Australia and New Zealand are among the very
small group of countries with a streak of high current account deficits in
excess of ten years. In the subsection that follows I will analyze some of the
most important characteristics of deﬁcits reversals.
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Source: Computed by the author.
Note: The countries in this list have had a “high current account deﬁcit” for at least ﬁve years
in a row. See the text for the exact deﬁnition of “high current account deﬁcit.”1.4.2 Current Account Reversals: How Common, How Costly?
In this section I provide an analysis of current account reversals. In par-
ticular I ask three questions: First, how common are large current account
deﬁcit reversals? Second, from a historical point of view, have these rever-
sals been associated with currency or ﬁnancial crashes? Third, how costly,
in terms of economic performance indicators, have these reversals been?
With respect to this third point, I argue that the most severe eﬀect of cur-
rent account reversals on economic performance takes place indirectly,
through their impact on investment. The analysis presented in this subsec-
tion complements the results in a recent important paper by Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (2000).15
I use two alternative deﬁnitions of current account reversals: Reversal1 is
deﬁned as a reduction in the deﬁcit of at least three percent of GDP in one
year, and Reversal2 is deﬁned as a reduction of the deﬁcit of at least 3 per-
cent of GDP in a three-yearperiod. Due to space considerations, the results
reported here correspond to those obtained when the Reversal1 deﬁnition
was used. However, the results obtained under the alternative—and less
strict—deﬁnition, Reversal2, were very similar to those discussed in this
subsection.16
The ﬁrst question I ask is how common reversals are. This issue is ad-
dressed in table 1.8, where I present tabulations by region, as well as for the
complete sample, for the Reversal1 variable. As may be seen, for the sample
as a whole the incidence of “reversals” was equal to 16.7 percent of the
yearly episodes. This reversal occurrence varied across regions; not surpris-
ingly, given the deﬁnition of reversals, the lowest incidence is in the indus-
trialized countries (6 percent). The two highest regions are Africa and the
Middle East, with 27 and 26 percent of reversals respectively. Both from a
theoretical and from a policy perspective, it is important to determine
whether these reversals are short lived or sustained. Short-term reversals
may be the result of consumption smoothing, while more permanent ones
are likely to be the consequence of policy-related external adjustments. I ad-
dress this issue by asking in how many “reversal” cases the current account
deﬁcit was still lower three years after the reversal was detected. The answer
lies in the two-way tabulation tables presented in table 1.9.17 These results
indicate that, for the sample as a whole, 45 percent of the “reversals” were
translated into a medium-term (three-year) improvement in the current ac-
count balance. The degree of permanency of these reversals varied by re-
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15. My data set, however, is larger than that of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000).
16. These deﬁnitions of reversal are somewhat diﬀerent from those used by Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (2000).
17. This table includes only countries whose population is greater than half a million people
and whose GDP per capita is above $500. It also excludes countries whose current account was
in surplus.gion, however. In the advanced countries, 75 percent of the reversals were
sustained after three years; the smallest percentage corresponds to the
Latin American nations, where only 37 percent of the reversals were sus-
tained after three years.
In their inﬂuential paper, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) analyzed the
eﬀects of current account reversals on economic performance and in par-
ticular on GDP growth. They relied on two methods to address this issue.
They ﬁrst used a “before and after” approach and tentatively concluded
that “reversals in current account deﬁcits are not necessarily associated
with domestic output compression” (302). Since “before and after” analy-
ses are subject to a number of serious shortcomings, Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin also address the issue by estimating a number of multiple regressions
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Table 1.8 Current Account Reversals: Tabulations by Region, 1970–97
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Industrialized
0 451 93.96 93.96
12 9 6.04 100.00
Total 480 100.00
Latin America
0 359 81.04 81.04
18 4 18.96 100.00
Total 443 100.00
Asia
0 250 85.91 85.91
14 1 14.09 100.00
Total 291 100.00
Africa
0 230 72.56 72.56
18 7 27.44 100.00
Total 317 100.00
Middle East
0 156 74.29 74.29
15 4 25.71 100.00
Total 210 100.00
Eastern Europe
0 134 85.90 85.90
12 2 14.10 100.00
Total 156 100.00
All countries
0 1580 83.29 83.29
1 317 16.71 100.00
Total 1897 100.00
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note:Reversals are deﬁned as a reduction in the deﬁcit of at least 3 percent of GDP in one year.
A number 1 captures reversals. The data set has been restricted to countries with populations
in excess of half a million people and GDP per capita over $500 at PPP value.Does the Current Account Matter? 47
Table 1.9 Current Account Reversals and Medium-Term Improvement
Reversal in 1 year
(Greater than 3%)
CAD Improvement 0 1 Total
Industrial
0 128 5 133
1 156 12 168
Total 284 17 301
Latin America
0 156 33 189
1 174 19 193
Total 330 52 382
Asia
0 137 18 155
1 116 13 129
Total 253 31 284
Africa
0 211 72 283
1 231 61 292
Total 442 133 575
Middle East
04 5 1 1 5 6
16 2 8 7 0
Total 107 19 126
Eastern Europe
06 7 6 7 3
13 6 6 4 2
Total 103 12 115
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: CAD improvement is in a three-year period, forward.
on diﬀerent samples. Their dependent variable is the rate of per capita out-
put growth, and the independent variables include a measure of exchange
rate overvaluation, an index of openness, the level of indebtedness, initial
GDP, and the investment-to-GDP ratio, among others. After analyzing the
results obtained from this regression analysis, the authors argue that “re-
versals . . . are not systematically associated with a growth slowdown”
(303).
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) reach this conclusion after estimating
growth equations that control for investment (among other variables). It is
highly probable, however, that current account reversals aﬀect investment it-
self,and that through this channel they aﬀect real GDP growth. The reason
for this potential eﬀect of reversals is rather simple: investment is ﬁnanced
by the sum of national and foreign saving. The latter, of course, is exactly
equal to the current account deﬁcit. Thus, any current account reversal will
imply a reduction in foreign saving. What will happen to aggregate saving,and thus to investment, will depend on the relationship between foreign and
national saving. The existing empirical evidence on this matter strongly sug-
gests that foreign saving partially, and only partially, crowds out domestic
saving. Edwards (1996), for example, estimated a number of private saving
equations for developing countries and found that the coeﬃcient of the cur-
rent account deﬁcit was signiﬁcant and in the neighborhood of –0.4.
Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000) used a new data set on private
savings in emerging economies and estimated that the coeﬃcient of the cur-
rent account deﬁcit was –0.33 and highly signiﬁcant. These results, then,
suggest that a decline in foreign saving—that is, a lower current account
deﬁcit—will reduce aggregate saving and, thus, aggregate investment. Since
there is ample evidence supporting the idea that investment has a positive
eﬀect on growth, the previous argument would suggest that, in contrast
with Milesi-Ferretti and Razin’s (2000) claim, current account reversals will
have a negative, albeit indirect, eﬀect on growth.
In order to investigate whether indeed current account reversals have af-
fected aggregate investment negatively, I estimated a number of investment
equations using panel data for a large number of countries for the period
1970–97. The recent empirical literature on investment, including Attana-
sio, Picci, and Scorcu (2000), indicates that investment exhibits a strong de-
gree of persistence through time. This suggests estimating equations of the
following type:18
(10) INVGDP tj   INVGDP t–1, j   δ GOVCONStj
INVGDP tj     TRADE_OPENNESStj   γ REVERSALtj   ωtj,
where INVGDP is the investment-to-GDP ratio, GOVCONS is the ratio of
government expenditure to GDP, and TRADE_OPENNESS is an index
that captures the degree of openness of the economy. REVERSAL is a vari-
able that takes the value of 1 if the country in question has been subject to
a current account reversal, and 0 otherwise.19 Finally, ω is an error term,
which takes the following form:
ωtj   εj   µtj,
where εj is a country-speciﬁc error term and µtj is an independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) disturbance with the standard characteristics.
The estimation of equation (10) presents two problems. First, it is well
known from early work on dynamic panel estimation by Nerlove (1971) that
if the error contains a country-speciﬁc term, the coeﬃcient of the lagged de-
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18. On recent attempts to estimate investment equations using a cross section of countries
see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Attanasio, Picci, and Scorcu (2000).
19. In principle, the log of initial GDP may also be included. However, because of the panel
nature of the data, and given the estimation procedures used, this is not possible.pendent variable will be biased upward. There are several ways of handling
this potential problem. Possibly the most basic approach is using a ﬁxed
eﬀect model, in which a country dummy (one hopes) picks up the eﬀect of
the country-speciﬁc disturbance. A second way is to estimate the instru-
mental variables procedure recently proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
for dynamic panel data. This method consists of diﬀerentiating the equa-
tion in question, equation (10) in our case, in order to eliminate the coun-
try-speciﬁc disturbance εj. The diﬀerenced equation is then estimated using
instrumental variables, where the lagged dependent variable (in levels), the
predetermined variables (also in levels), and the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the ex-
ogenous variables are used as instruments. In this paper I report results
from the estimation of equation (10) using both a ﬁxed eﬀect procedure and
the Arellano and Bond method.
A second problem in estimating equation (10) is that, since current ac-
count reversals are not drawn from a random experiment, the REVERSALjt
dummy is possibly correlated with the error term. Under these circum-
stances, the estimated coeﬃcients in equation (10) will be biased and mis-
leading. In order to deal with this problem I follow the procedure recently
suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) for estimating
“treatment interventions” models. This procedure consists of estimating
the equation in question using observations that have a common support
for both the treated and the nontreated. In the case at hand, countries that
experience a reversal are considered to be subject to the “treatment inter-
vention.” From a practical point of view, a two-step procedure is used. First,
the conditional probability of countries facing a reversal, called the propen-
sity score, is ﬁrst estimated using a probit regression. Second, the equation
of interest is estimated using only observations whose estimated probabil-
ity of reversal falls within the interval of estimated probabilities for coun-
tries with actual reversals. I follow the Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
(1997, 1998) sample correction both for the ﬁxed eﬀect and the Arellano
and Bond procedures. In estimating the propensity scores I used a panel
data probit procedure and included as regressors the level of the current ac-
count deﬁcit in the previous period, the level of the ﬁscal deﬁcit, domestic
credit creation, and time-speciﬁc dummies. The results obtained from this
ﬁrst step are not presented here due to space consideration but are available
on request. Table 1.10 contains the results of estimating investment equa-
tion (10) on an unbalanced panel of 128 countries for the period 1971–97.
In part A of table 1.10 I present the results obtained from the estimation of
the Arellano-Bond instrumental variables procedure. In part B of table 1.10
I present the results from the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation. In both cases I have
introduced the REVERSALS indicator both contemporaneously and
with a one-period lag. In the Arellano-Bond estimates, the standard errors
have been computed using White’s robust procedure that corrects for
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Robust
INVGDP Coeff. Std. Err. zP   | z | 95% Conf. Interval
A. Arellano-Bond Instrumental Variablesa
INVGDP LD 0.6212481 0.0835012 7.44 0.000 0.4575887 0.7849075
GOVCON D1          0.0819257 0.0106311 0.77 0.441 –0.1264401 0.2902916
REV D1 –2.021207 0.2545002 –7.94 0.000 –2.520018 –1.522396
REVLAG –0.8834781 0.2235849 –3.95 0.000 –1.321696 –0.4452596
TRADE D1 0.0436178 0.0127593 3.42 0.001 0.0186101 0.0686255
_CONS D1 –0.0480371 0.0169209 –2.84 0.005 –0.0812014 –0.0148727
Number of obs. 1,800
Number of groups 127







Coeff. Std. Err. tP   | t | 95% Conf. Interval
B. Fixed Effects Method b
INVGDP1 0.7655012 0.0139967 54.69 0.000 0.7380497 0.7929527
GOVCON 0.0326171 0.0186247 1.75 0.080 –0.0039113 0.0691455
REV –2.05903 0.1622943 –12.69 0.000 –2.377336 –1.740724
REVLAG –0.8404217 0.1585791 –5.30 0.000 –1.151441 –0.5294026
TRADE 0.0324689 0.0051885 6.26 0.000 0.0222927 0.042645








Number of obs. 1,927






Prob   F 0.0000
aArellano-Bond dynamic panel data. Group variable (i): imfcode; time variable (t): year. Arellano-Bond
test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: H0, no autocorrelation; z = –4.46; Prob   z
= 0.0000. Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: H0, no autocorre-
lation; z = –1.08; Prob   z = 0.2809.
bFixed-effects (within) regression. Group variable (i): imfcode. Ftest that all u_i = 0: F(127, 1794) = 2.61;
Prob   F = 0.0000.
cFraction of variance due to u_i.heteroskedasticity. The results obtained are quite interesting. In both pan-
els the coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable is relatively high, cap-
turing the presence of persistence. Notice, however, that the coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcantly smaller when the Arellano-Bond procedure is used. The co-
eﬃcient of GOVCON is positive and nonsigniﬁcant. The estimated coeﬃ-
cient of trade openness is signiﬁcant and positive, indicating that, after con-
trolling for other factors, countries with a more open trade sector will tend
to a higher investment-to-GDP ratio. More importantly for this paper, the
coeﬃcients of the contemporaneous and lagged reversal indicator are sig-
niﬁcantly negative, with very similar point estimates. Interestingly, when
the REVERSAL variable was added with a two-year lag, its estimated co-
eﬃcient was not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
In order to check for the robustness of these results, I also estimated
equation (10) using alternative samples and deﬁnitions of current account
reversals. The results obtained provide a strong support to those shown
here and indicate that, indeed, current account reversals have aﬀected eco-
nomic performance negatively through the investment channel. An impor-
tant question is whether the compression in investment is a result of private
or public sector behavior. An analysis undertaken on a smaller sample
(forty-four countries) suggests that, although both private- and public-sec-
tor investment are negatively aﬀected by current account reversals, the im-
pact is signiﬁcantly higher on private investment. According to these esti-
mates, available from the author, a current account reversal results in a
decline in private investment equal to 1.8 percent of GDP; the long-term re-
duction of public-sector investment is estimated to be, on average, 0.5 per-
cent of GDP.
An important question is whether current account reversals have aﬀected
economic growth through other channels. I investigated this issue by using
the large data set to estimate a number of basic growth equations of the fol-
lowing type.
(11) GROWTHtj   INVGDP tj   δ GOVCONStj
GROWTHtj     TRADE_OPENNESStj   θ LOGGDPOj
  γ REVERSALtj   ξtj,
where GROWTHtj is growth of GDP per capita in country j during year t,
and LOGGDPOj is the initial level of GDP (1970) for country j. As Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have pointed out, the coeﬃcient of GOVCONS is
expected to be negative, while that of openness is expected to be positive. If
there is a catching-up in growth, we would expect that the estimated coeﬃ-
cient of the logarithm of 1970 GDP per capita will be negative. The main in-
terest of this analysis is the coeﬃcient of REVERSAL. If sharp and large
reductions in the current account deﬁcit have a negative eﬀect on invest-
ment, we would expect the estimated γ to be signiﬁcantly negative. The er-
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country (panel). Thus, assuming k panels (countries):
E(ξξ )  
 
σ2









Equation (12) was estimated using the feasible generalized least squares
procedure (FGLS) suggested by Beck and Katz (1995) for unbalanced pan-
els. The samples in the diﬀerent estimations were determined by the avail-
ability of data on the diﬀerent regressors. The data were obtained from the
World Bank and from the Summer and Hestons data set. In the base esti-
mates I used the deﬁnition of current account reversals given by Reversal1
above. The basic results obtained from the estimation of equation (11) are
presented in table 1.11. In addition to the regressors in equation (11), I in-
troduced time-speciﬁc dummy variables. As may be seen from the table, the
results obtained support the hypothesis that current account reversals have
had a negative eﬀect on GDP per capita growth, even after controlling by
investment. Moreover, the coeﬃcients for the other variables in the regres-
sion have the expected signs and are signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
When alternative estimation techniques were used, including ﬁxed eﬀects,
the results obtained were very similar.20
1.5 Current Account Deﬁcits and Financial Crises: 
How Strong Is the Link?
As we pointed out in section 1.2 of this paper, a large number of recent
empirical studies have been unable to ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant connec-
tion between large current account deﬁcits and ﬁnancial crises (Frankel and
Rose 1996). However, much of the policy literature—both from investment
banks and from the multilateral institutions—insists that large deﬁcits have
been at the center of recent crises. In this section, I address this issue by an-
alyzing in some detail the evidence on ﬁnancial crises in a large cross section
of countries. The section is organized as follows: In section 1.5.1, I deal with
the deﬁnition of crisis.In section 1.5.2, I provide some preliminary evidence
on the connection between current account reversals and crises, as well
as between high current account deficits and crises. In this analysis I use
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20. Naturally, when ﬁxed eﬀects are used it is not possible to include (the log of) initial GDP
as a regressor.
(12) E(ξξ )  Table 1.11 GDP Growth and Current Account Reversals: Feasible Least Squares with
Heteroskedastic Panels
GDP Growth Coeff. Std. Err. zP   | z | 95% Conf. Interval
INVGDP 0.1732786 0.0129535 13.38 0.000 0.1478901 0.198667
GOVCON –0.044147 0.0129061 –3.42 0.001 –0.0694425 –0.0188514
TRADE 0.0066118 0.0021185 3.12 0.002 0.0024595 0.010764
LOGGPP0 –0.7458834 0.0754805 –9.88 0.000 –0.8938225 –0.5979443
REV –0.8387433 0.2063497 –4.06 0.000 –1.243181 –0.4343053
REVLAG           –0.3106008 0.2014468 –1.54 0.123 –0.7054293 0.0842277
D73 1.270318 0.759329 1.67 0.094 –0.2179398 2.758575
D74 –1.342419 0.7482716 –1.79 0.073 –2.809004 0.1241666
D75 –3.115973 0.7482444 –4.16 0.000 –4.582505 –1.649441
D76 0.6267746 0.7248618 0.86 0.387 –0.7939283 2.047478
D77 –0.9757318 0.6522791 –1.50 0.135 –2.254175 0.3027116
D78 0.1379759 0.5050662 0.27 0.785 –0.8519357 1.127887
D79 –1.096983 0.6317958 –1.74 0.083 –2.33528 0.1413142
D80 –2.360201 0.6280218 –3.76 0.000 –3.591101 –1.129301
D81 –2.826354 0.6242467 –4.53 0.000 –4.049855 –1.602853
D82 –4.194326 0.6217559 –6.75 0.000 –5.412945 –2.975707
D83 –2.990355 0.6199746 –4.82 0.000 –4.205483 –1.775227
D84 –1.221758 0.6185186 –1.98 0.048 –2.434032 –0.0094836
D85 –1.784731 0.6187208 –2.88 0.004 –2.997401 –0.5720605
D86 –1.75282 0.617261 –2.84 0.005 –2.962629 –0.5430107
D87 –1.596635 0.6173792 –2.59 0.010 –2.806676 –0.3865935
D88 –0.7132081 0.6150168 –1.16 0.246 –1.918619 0.4922027
D89 –1.492796 0.6147887 –2.43 0.015 –2.69776 –0.2878324
D90 –2.005303 0.6140373 –3.27 0.001 –3.208794 –0.8018121
D91 –2.686583 0.6082038 –4.42 0.000 –3.878641 –1.494526
D92 –2.38132 0.6155925 –3.87 0.000 –3.587859 –1.17478
D93 –2.23038 0.6150288 –3.63 0.000 –3.435814 –1.024945
D94 –0.8790476 0.6164939 –1.43 0.154 –2.087353 0.3292582
D95 –0.9938183 0.5940141 –1.67 0.094 –2.158065 0.170428
D96 –1.480438 0.6129868 –2.42 0.016 –2.68187 –0.2790063
D97 –1.263988 0.6449348 –1.96 0.050 –2.528037 0.0000611
_Cons 7.826786 0.8179467 9.57 0.000 6.22364 9.429932
Number of obs. 1,856





Wald  2 (31) 708.80








Notes: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression. Coefﬁcients: generalized least squares; panels: het-
eroskedastic; correlation: no autocorrelation.statistical methods borrowed from the epidemiology literature. Finally, in
section 1.5.3, I provide some empirical results, obtained using econometric
techniques, on the relationship between large current account deﬁcits and
ﬁnancial crises. I argue that whether one ﬁnds a connection depends largely
on three factors: (1) the deﬁnition of crisis, (2) the sample considered, and
(3) the lag structure used in the analysis.
1.5.1 Deﬁning a Crisis
Paul Krugman has recently said that “there is no generally accepted for-
mal deﬁnition of a currency crisis, but we know them when we see them”
(Krugman 2000, 1). While some authors, including myself in Edwards
(1989) and Edwards and Santaella (1993), have deﬁned a currency crisis as
a very signiﬁcant depreciation of the currency (see also Frankel and Rose
1996 and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 2000) others have deﬁned a crisis as a
situation in which a country’s currency is depreciated or its international re-
serves are seriously depleted (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1996; Gold-
stein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart 2000). In this paper, and in order to cast a
very wide net in the empirical analysis, I have used two alternative criteria
for deﬁning crises.
The ﬁrst deﬁnition follows Frankel and Rose (1996) and deﬁnes a cur-
rency crisis as a situation in which there is a currency depreciation of at least
25 percent as well as a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation. I call
this variable aevent.21 The second deﬁnition is broader, and includes as
crises situations in which the country in question has experienced a large de-
preciation or a signiﬁcant loss in reserves. In constructing this variable,
which I call acrisis, I followed a three-step procedure:
1. I created a weighted average index of monthly rate of change of the ex-
change rate (∆e/e) and of reserves (∆R/R), such that both components of
the index have equal sample volatility: It   ∆e/e – (σe/σR)   (∆R/R).
2. I deﬁne a crisis (Ct) to have taken place when the index exceeds the
mean of the index plus three standard deviations:
Ct   
1 if It ≥ mean (It)   3σI
0 otherwise
3. I annualized the crisis index by considering each year as a June-June
period. In other words, a year t is assigned a crisis ( 1) if any month be-
tween June of year t and June of year t   1 is a crisis.
As Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) have pointed out, results from crisis
analyses may be aﬀected by the treatment of currency upheaval in consec-
utive years. In order to address this issue, I deﬁned two additional crisis
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21. The index was constructed on monthly data. In order to annualize it, I consider June-to-
June years.indicators that exclude adjacent “crises.” These indicators consider a three-
year window after each crisis: aevent2 is the three-year window correspon-
ding to aevent, and acrisis2 is the corresponding indicator for acrisis.
How frequent have currency crises taken place, according to these indi-
cators? This question is addressed in table 1.12, where I present tabulations
for the four indexes for the complete sample. As may be seen, the frequency
of “crises” goes from 4 percent to 11 percent of the country-year observa-
tions. In terms of the distribution across regions (the results are not pre-
sented in detail due to space considerations) according to both aevent indi-
cators, crises have had a higher frequency in Eastern Europe; the lowest
frequency is in the industrialized nations, with no crises recorded. The acri-
sisindex records a frequency at approximately 10 percent in Latin America,
Asia, and Africa; the acrisis2 index shows that the highest frequency of
crises has been in Africa, with a 13.7 percent frequency of occurrence.
1.5.2 Current Account Reversals and Crises: A Preliminary Analysis
An important ﬁnding from the preceding analysis is that current account
reversals are common and quite frequent. Countries in every region tend to
run deﬁcits that occasionally exceed their long-run sustainable level. This
means that, as documented above, at some point the country must go
through an adjustment process in which the current account deﬁcit is re-
versed and moves closer to its long-run equilibrium. From a policy perspec-
tive, it is important to understand whether current account reversals are
related to currency crises. In order to address this issue, I followed a 
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Table 1.12 Frequency of Crises: Alternative Indicators
Frequency Percent Cumulative
aevent: (mean) event
0 2818 94.09 94.09
1 177 5.91 100.00
Total 2995 100.00
aevent2
0 2318 95.79 95.79
1 102 4.21 100.00
Total 2420 100.00
acrisis: (mean) crisis
0 2548 90.26 90.26
1 275 9.74 100.00
Total 2823 100.00
acrisis2
0 1564 88.91 88.91
1 195 11.09 100.00
Total 1759 100.00
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: See the text for the exact deﬁnition of these indicators.case-control methodology.22 This approach consists of using a  2 statistic to
formally test whether there is a signiﬁcant relationship between a particular
outcome (the case) and another variable to which both case and control vari-
ables have been exposed. The ﬁrst step in applying this approach, then, is to
separate observations into a case group and a control group. A country that
for a given year experienced a “crisis” is considered to be a case, and noncri-
sis observations constitute the control group. The second step consists of cal-
culating how many observations in both the case and control groups have
been subject to a current account reversal. From this information an odds ra-
tio is computed, and a  2 test is computed in order to determine whether the
odds ratio is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. If the null hypothesis cannot be re-
jected, then there is evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries that
are subject to a reversal have a signiﬁcant probability of experiencing a crisis.
The computation of the  2 test statistic using contemporaneous values of
crisis and reversals results in the rejectionof the null hypothesis that reversal
countries are associated with a crisis. This result holds for all four deﬁnitions
of a crisis. The p-values of the  2tests are on the order of 0.6, or higher. This
result is consistent with the conclusions reached through a less formal anal-
ysis, and using a smaller data set, by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000).
A possible limitation of a simple application of this  2 test, however, is
that from a theoretical point of view the relationship between reversals and
crises implies complex timing and causality issues. In fact, there are reasons
to believe that reversals may occur at the same time as a crisis, before a cri-
sis, or even after a crisis. For instance, the reversal may be so pronounced
that the country in question has no alternative but to devalue its currency
or deplete its international reserves. There is no reason, however, why these
phenomena would take place at exactly the same time. Also, the reversal
may be the result, rather than the cause, of a devaluation. For this reason, I
also asked whether there is statistical evidence that there is a current ac-
count reversal in the “neighborhood” of a crisis. In order to do this, I deﬁne
a new variable, reversaln,that takes a value of one on the year a reversal was
detected, as well as in the previous and next years. The results from this sec-
ond test suggest that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that cur-
rency crises occur “in the neighborhood of” current account reversals. This
is the case for any of the four crisis deﬁnitions used in this study. In table 1.13
I present the results obtained from the computation of these  2 statistics
when the aeventdeﬁnition of crisis was considered as the “case.” In order to
illustrate the nature of the results I have presented the  2 corresponding to
two deﬁnitions of reversals. In part A I used the narrow one-year deﬁnition
of reversal, while in part B I use the broader three-year neighborhood deﬁ-
nition of reversal. As may be seen, although in part A the  2 test is not sig-
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22. This approach is used frequently by epidemiologists. I became interested in the statisti-
cal techniques used by epidemiologists while doing research on ﬁnancial crisis contagion across
countries (see Edwards 2000). See Fleiss (1981) for details on the actual case-control method.niﬁcant, in part B it is highly signiﬁcant—the p-value is 0.009.23Results ob-
tained for the other three deﬁnitions of a crisis are very similar and are avail-
able from the author on request.
1.5.3 Current Account Deﬁcits and Currency Crises: A Formal Analysis
In a recent and inﬂuential paper, Frankel and Rose (1996) empirically an-
alyzed the determinants of currency crashes. Their data set included 105
countries for the period 1970–91, and their deﬁnition of a crisis was con-
ﬁned to devaluations in excess of 25 percent.24 The results from their probit
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Table 1.13 Case-Control  2 Test: Analysis of Crisis and Current Account Reversals
(for Aevent deﬁnition of crisis)
Proportion
Exposed Unexposed Total Exposed
A. Exposed: Reversal1 deﬁnition of current account reversala
Cases 28 124 152 0.1842
Controls 410 1,793 2,203 0.1861
Total 438 1,917 2,355 1.1860
Point Estimate 95% Conf. Interval
Odds ratio 
(Cornﬁeld) 0.9874902 0.6481554 1.504718
Prev. frac. ex. 
(Cornﬁeld) 0.0125098 –0.504718 0.3518446
Prev. frac. pop 0.0023282
Proportion
Exposed Unexposed Total Exposed
B. Exposed: Reversaln1 deﬁnition of current account reversal b
Cases 52 35 87 0.5977
Controls 563 679 1,242 0.4533
Total 615 714 1,329 0.4628
Point Estimate 95% Conf. Interval
Odds ratio 
(Cornﬁeld) 1.791829 1.15408 2.718784
Attr. frac. ex. 
(Cornﬁeld) 0.4419112 0.1335086 0.6405185
Attr. frac. pop. 0.2641308
Source: Computed by the author.
Note: Prev. = previous; frac. = fraction; ex. = explained; pop. = population; attr. = attributed.
a 2 (1) = 0.00; Prob.    2 = 0.9536.
b 2 (1) = 6.82; Prob.    2 = 0.0090.
23. These results, however, should be interpreted with caution, as they are subject to all the
limitations of this type of case-control analysis, including the fact that no causality can be es-
tablished. In this case, however, I am not particularly interested in causation.
24. See section 1.5.1 for a discussion of their deﬁnition.regression analysis indicated that a number of variables were good predic-
tors of a currency crash. These included the fraction of the debt obtained in
concessional terms, the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP, the
reserves-to-imports ratio, the rate of growth of domestic credit, the coun-
try’s rate of growth, and international interest rates. In terms of the present
paper, what is particularly interesting is that in Frankel and Rose (1996) the
current account deﬁcit was not signiﬁcant, and in many of the regressions
it even had the wrongsign. This led the authors to conclude that, “curiously,
neither current account nor government budget deﬁcits appear to play an
important role in a typical crash” (365).25
My own initial analysis of the determinants of crises, using an almost
identical data set, supports the results reported by Frankel and Rose (1996).
When a broad sample and their regressors are used, the current account
seems to play no role in major currency crashes.26 This is the case indepen-
dently of the estimation technique used, and of whether the actual value of
the current account deﬁcit or a dummy for high deﬁcits is included as a re-
gressor. To my surprise, the incorporation of an independent variable that
interacted the ﬁscal and current account deﬁcits (the “twin” deﬁcits) did
not change the result.
In order to investigate this issue further, and in an eﬀort to determine the
robustness of these results, I followed four avenues of analysis: First, I in-
quired whether the results would hold under alternative data sets. In partic-
ular, I investigated whether the exclusion of particular regions would alter
the ﬁnding of current account “irrelevance.” Second, I considered alternative
sets of independent variables in the estimation of probit equations for crises.
In particular I considered alternative lag structures, and I included some
variables that capture the economic structure of the countries in the sample.
Third, I considered alternative deﬁnitions of crisis. More speciﬁcally, I esti-
mated a number of probit equations for all four deﬁnitions of crisis described
in subsection 1.5.1 of this paper: aevent, aevent2, acrisis,and acrisis2.Fourth,
I used diﬀerent estimation techniques and considered assumptions regard-
ing the nature of the error term, including the assumption that it takes a ran-
dom eﬀect form. Generally speaking, the results obtained were not aﬀected
by the technique used, and for this reason I only report the basic results.
In the estimation of crisis models I used the following regressors:27
(1) percentage of debt in commercial terms; (2) percentage of debt in con-
cessional terms; (3) percentage of debt at variable rate; (4) percentage of
short-term debt; (5) FDI; (6) public-sector debt as percentage of GDP; (7)
debt to the multilateral institutions; (8) the ratio of (gross) international re-
serves to imports; (9) the ratio of foreign debt to GDP; (10) the rate of
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25. This ﬁnding is not aﬀected by any of the sensitivity tests undertaken by the authors.
26. By “broad sample” I mean one that includes all regions in the world.
27. Most, but not all, of these regressors were used by Frankel and Rose (1996). The results
reported here are not directly comparable to those of Frankel and Rose (1996), since the data
sets are somewhat diﬀerent.growth of domestic credit; (11) deviations of the real exchange rate from
PPP (a measure of “overvaluation”); (12) the rate of growth of GDP; (13)
the degree of openness of the economy, measured as imports plus exports
divided by GDP; (14) the ratio of government expenditure to GDP; (15) in-
terest rates in the advanced countries; and (16) the current account deﬁcit.
All the variables are from the World Bank and, as in the Frankel and Rose
(1996) paper, cover the 1971–92 period. With the exception of the crisis in-
dexes, trade openness, and government consumption, these variables cor-
respond to those used by Frankel and Rose (1996).
In reporting the regressions, I follow the tradition of presenting the
eﬀects of a unitary change in the independent variables on the probability
of a crisis. In all of the regressions I report White’s robust standard errors
that correct for heteroskedasticity.
The results obtained when all variables are entered contemporaneously
and all regions are included are presented in table 1.14. The results are quite
interesting and, to a large extent, in agreement with expectations. In terms
of the current account—the variable of greatest interest in this paper—the
results show signiﬁcant diﬀerences, depending on the deﬁnition of crisis
used. For both the acrisis and acrisis2 indicators, the estimated coeﬃcient
of the current account deﬁcit to GDP is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level. On the other hand, when the aevent and aevent2 currency
crash indicators are used as the dependent variable, the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of the current account deﬁcits are not signiﬁcant, and in the case of
aevent2, the sign is incorrect (although it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero). Of course, the results for the events correspond to the Frankel and
Rose (1996) ﬁndings discussed above. In terms of the other regressors, the
results in table 1.14 suggest that higher reserves and higher growth reduce
the probability of both types of crisis. Large FDI plays a particularly im-
portant role in reducing the probability of an eventtype of crisis. A high per-
centage of debt in commercial terms increases the probability of both types
of crisis. A greater degree of openness reduces the probability under all cri-
sis deﬁnitions. Notice that in contrast with the Frankel and Rose (1996) re-
sults, a higher public deﬁcit ratio signiﬁcantly increases the probability of
aevent-type crises.
The results presented in table 1.14 were obtained using a data set that cov-
ers every region. There are, however, important reasons to believe that
(most) African countries have behaved diﬀerently during the period under
study. This is the case for two reasons: First, during the complete period un-
der analysis a large number of African nations belonged to the CFA cur-
rency zone and were institutionally shielded from devaluations. Second, it
is well known that during most of this period even non-CFA African na-
tions had a great reluctance to adjust their parity. This was the case even
when the external imbalance was very large (World Bank 1994). An impor-
tant question, then, is how these results will be aﬀected if the African na-
tions are excluded from the sample. This is done in table 1.15, where probit
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Robust
Deﬁnition dF/dx Std. Err. zP   | z | x-bar 95% Conf. Interval
A. acrisis Deﬁnition
COMRAT 0.0033323 0.0017217 1.90 0.057 21.0027 –0.000042 0.006707
CONRAT –0.0010057 0.0007642 –1.30 0.193 32.5979 –0.002504 0.000492
VARRAT –0.0025776 0.0016872 –1.51 0.131 21.9735 –0.005884 0.000729
FDISTOCK 0.0052372 0.0022728 –2.27 0.023 2.62669 –0.009692 0.000783
SHORTTOT 0.0019636 0.0015704 1.27 0.203 14.6745 –0.001114 0.005041
PUBRAT 0.0009573 0.0010942 0.88 0.381 72.419 –0.001187 0.003102
MULTIRAT 0.0020735 0.0008301 2.44 0.015 21.4711 0.000447 0.0037
DEBTY 0.0002462 0.0002104 1.16 0.247 59.5954 –0.000166 0.000659
RESERVEM –0.0000357 0.0000375 –0.94 0.345 324.331 –0.000109 0.000038
DEFRAT 0.0011096 0.0016363 0.68 0.497 5.15325 –0.002097 0.004317
DLCRED 0.0010474 0.0003367 3.23 0.001 21.875 0.000387 0.001707
DLY –0.0027143 0.0013687 –2.00 0.046 3.51322 –0.005397 0.000032
ISTAR 0.0020625 0.0030204 0.68 0.497 8.64066 –0.003857 0.007982
OVERVALN 0.0001934 0.0004058 0.48 0.634 –7.88634 –0.000602 0.000989
TRADE –0.0009073 0.0005028 –1.74 0.082 46.3937 –0.001893 0.000078
GOVCON –0.0001539 0.0017092 –0.09 0.928 14.0511 –0.003504 0.003196
CAD 0.0031167 0.0016689 1.83 0.067 4.36866 –0.000154 0.006388
obs. P 0.1031149
pred. P 0.0773022 (at x-bar)
Number of obs. 931
Wald  2 (17) 56.70




COMRAT 0.0046036 0.0026754 1.65 0.100 19.9146 –0.00064 0.009847
CONRAT –0.0012766 0.0010286 –1.24 0.213 34.1878 –0.003293 0.000739
VARRAT –0.0044843 0.0025206 –1.71 0.086 21.1016 –0.009425 0.000456
FDISTOCK –0.0046245 0.0028175 –1.65 0.099 3.12262 –0.010147 0.000898
SHORTTOT 0.0014552 0.0020551 0.71 0.479 14.7062 –0.002573 0.005483
PUBRAT –0.0001517 0.0014676 –0.10 0.918 72.5714 –0.003028 0.002725
MULTIRAT 0.003031 0.0010866 2.66 0.008 21.5175 0.000901 0.005161
DEBTY 0.0002802 0.0003342 0.83 0.404 54.2499 –0.000375 0.000935
RESERVEM –0.0000196 0.0000514 –0.38 0.703 328.907 –0.00012 0.000081
DEFRAT 0.0020843 0.002524 0.82 0.410 4.60205 –0.002863 0.007031
DLCRED 0.0020764 0.0005264 4.02 0.000 18.7089 0.001045 0.003108
DLY –0.002937 0.0019957 –1.48 0.140 3.97093 –0.006849 0.000975
ISTAR 0.0052748 0.0038629 1.36 0.173 8.50495 –0.002296 0.012846
OVERVALN 0.0005167 0.000559 0.91 0.361 –8.22226 –0.000579 0.001612
TRADE –0.0008263 0.0006416 –1.28 0.201 47.0451 –0.002084 0.000431
GOVCON 0.0016096 0.002514 0.65 0.518 13.8002 –0.003318 0.006537
CAD 0.0039213 0.0023943 1.61 0.107 3.95843 –0.000771 0.008614
obs. P 0.1209964
pred. P 0.0854189 (at  x-bar)
Number of obs. 562
Wald  2 (17) 56.69
Prob    2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1387
Log-likelihood –178.57014Table 1.14 (continued)
Robust
Deﬁnition dF/dx Std. Err. zP   | z | x-bar 95% Conf. Interval
C. aevent Deﬁnition
COMRAT 0.0003686 0.0008709 0.42 0.671 20.962 –0.001338 0.002075
CONRAT –0.000823 0.0004234 –1.82 0.069 32.6715 –0.001653 6.9e–06
VARRAT –0.0007301 0.0008421 –0.86 0.388 21.9302 –0.002381 0.000921
FDISTOCK –0.0033417 0.0012196 –2.69 0.007 2.62084 –0.005732 –0.000951
SHORTTOT –0.0000499 0.0008731 –0.06 0.955 14.6571 –0.001761 0.001661
PUBRAT –0.0001298 0.0006229 –0.21 0.836 72.4703 –0.001351 0.001091
MULTIRAT –0.0002948 0.0005312 –0.56 0.578 21.4961 –0.001336 0.000746
DEBTY 0.0002863 0.0001209 2.49 0.013 59.7336 0.000049 0.000523
RESERVEM –0.0000194 0.0000197 –1.01 0.315 325.061 –0.000058 0.000019
DEFRAT 0.0016828 0.0009088 1.85 0.065 5.21531 –0.000098 0.003464
DLCRED 0.0004128 0.0002005 2.53 0.012 21.8889 0.000026 0.000812
DLY –0.001096 0.0008227 –1.34 0.179 3.51907 –0.002708 0.000516
ISTAR –0.0000236 0.0017433 –0.01 0.989 8.63804 –0.00344 0.003393
OVERVALN –0.0003881 0.0002363 –1.64 0.102 –7.82043 –0.000851 0.000075
TRADE –0.001114 0.0003071 –3.06 0.002 46.3682 –0.001716 –0.000512
GOVCON –0.0037107 0.0012011 –2.97 0.003 14.071 –0.006065 –0.001357
CAD 0.0003098 0.0010221 0.30 0.764 4.37692 –0.001693 0.002313
obs. P 0.0706638
pred. P 0.0296255 (at  x-bar)
Number of obs. 934
Wald  2 (17) 70.66




COMRAT –0.000135 0.0009079 –0.15 0.883 19.8866 –0.001914 0.001644
CONRAT –0.0003336 0.000392 –0.85 0.395 35.0182 –0.001102 0.000435
VARRAT 7.77e–06 0.0008146 0.01 0.992 20.4507 –0.001589 0.001604
FDISTOCK –0.0015405 0.0009866 –1.62 0.104 3.08108 –0.003474 0.000393
SHORTTOT 0.0005935 0.0007601 0.81 0.416 14.3259 –0.000896 0.002083
PUBRAT 0.000125 0.0005304 0.24 0.810 72.7421 –0.000914 0.001164
MULTIRAT –0.0004797 0.0005018 –0.94 0.349 22.8628 –0.001463 0.000504
DEBTY 0.0002004 0.0001292 1.62 0.105 54.0278 –0.000053 0.000454
RESERVEM –0.0000252 0.0000191 –1.38 0.166 328.073 –0.000063 0.000012
DEFRAT 0.0022043 0.0010298 2.11 0.035 4.93033 0.000186 0.004223
DLCRED 0.0005069 0.000229 2.74 0.006 18.4827 0.000058 0.000956
DLY –0.0015771 0.0008004 –1.90 0.057 4.18559 –0.003146 –8.3e–06
ISTAR 0.0000685 0.0014788 0.05 0.963 8.62569 –0.00283 0.002967
OVERVALN –0.0001668 0.0002045 –0.84 0.402 –7.73555 –0.000568 0.000234
TRADE –0.0007145 0.0002938 –2.41 0.016 48.7758 –0.00129 –0.000139
GOVCON –0.0028422 0.001161 –2.20 0.028 14.5617 –0.005118 –0.000567
CAD –0.0007552 0.0009831 –0.79 0.432 4.27947 –0.002682 0.001172
obs. P 0.0555556
pred. P 0.0206342 (at  x-bar)
Number of obs. 702
Wald  2 (17) 48.97
Prob    2 0.0001
Pseudo R2 0.2208
Log-likelihood –117.36778
Notes: Probit estimates. The tests that the underlying coefﬁcient is 0 are z and P   | z |.Table 1.15 Probit Model of Currency Crises, Africa Excluded, 1971–92 (Probit Estimates)
Robust
Deﬁnition dF/dx Std. Err. zP   | z | x-bar 95% Conf. Interval
A. acrisis Deﬁnition
COMRAT 0.0029271 0.0020359 1.42 0.157 26.3123 –0.001063 0.006917
CONRAT –0.0012155 0.0008973 –1.32 0.186 28.4099 –0.002974 0.000543
VARRAT –0.0020405 0.0019753 –1.02 0.306 27.1534 –0.005912 0.001831
FDISTOCK –0.005784 0.0024845 –2.24 0.025 3.17666 –0.010653 0.000915
SHORTTOT 0.0016729 0.002148 0.81 0.418 15.9367 –0.002537 0.005883
PUBRAT 0.0014678 0.0013265 1.13 0.258 69.9099 –0.001132 0.004068
MULTIRAT 0.0026282 0.000894 2.77 0.006 19.8038 0.000876 0.00438
DEBTY 3.91e–06 0.0003489 0.01 0.991 53.1143 –0.00068 0.000688
RESERVEM –7.38e–06 0.0000403 –0.18 0.855 412.658 –0.000086 0.000072
DEFRAT 0.0010166 0.0019793 0.52 0.606 4.5621 –0.002863 0.004896
DLCRED 0.0008556 0.0003243 2.85 0.004 25.8435 0.00022 0.001491
DLY –0.0021348 0.0017565 –1.24 0.215 3.8471 –0.005577 0.001308
ISTAR 0.0026776 0.0036062 0.73 0.466 8.48895 –0.00439 0.009746
OVERVALN –0.0000309 0.0005285 –0.06 0.953 –5.23607 –0.001067 0.001005
TRADE –0.0010877 0.0006823 –1.48 0.140 47.171 –0.002425 0.00025
GOVCON 0.0017909 0.0023691 0.76 0.448 13.3222 –0.002852 0.006434
CAD 0.0048408 0.0021958 2.08 0.037 3.62618 0.000537 0.009145
obs. P 0.1075085
pred. P 0.0718758 (at x-bar)
Number of obs. 586
Wald  2 (17) 47.59




COMRAT 0.004239 0.0031281 1.27 0.203 25.0805 –0.001892 0.01037
CONRAT –0.0013723 0.0013069 –1.08 0.279 30.3854 –0.003934 0.001189
VARRAT –0.0049427 0.0028411 –1.67 0.095 26.3258 –0.010511 0.000626
FDISTOCK –0.0015863 0.0024665 –0.65 0.515 3.68785 –0.006421 0.003248
SHORTTOT 0.001403 0.0024508 0.57 0.569 16.3144 –0.003401 0.006207
PUBRAT –0.0001419 0.001806 –0.08 0.937 69.3619 –0.003682 0.003398
MULTIRAT 0.003184 0.0011121 2.54 0.011 19.659 0.001004 0.005364
DEBTY 0.0001755 0.0006922 0.25 0.800 47.3123 –0.001181 0.001532
RESERVEM 0.0000193 0.0000523 0.37 0.709 418.177 –0.000083 0.000122
DEFRAT 0.0015161 0.0030651 0.49 0.625 3.85896 –0.004491 0.007524
DLCRED 0.0016191 0.0005431 3.02 0.003 22.0399 0.000555 0.002684
DLY –0.0028787 0.0026685 –1.12 0.261 4.74403 –0.008109 0.002352
ISTAR 0.0047575 0.0043004 1.12 0.264 8.25318 –0.003671 0.013186
OVERVALN 0.004106 0.0006962 0.59 0.555 –3.96003 –0.000954 0.001775
TRADE –0.0019974 0.0007404 –2.51 0.012 48.4653 –0.003448 –0.000546
GOVCON 0.0074273 0.0029808 2.69 0.007 12.9495 0.001585 0.01327
CAD 0.0066269 0.0030252 2.15 0.032 2.94552 0.000698 0.012556
obs. P 0.1232092
pred. P 0.0684454 (at  x-bar)
Number of obs. 349
Wald  2 (17) 56.33
Prob    2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2104
Log-likelihood –102.86684Table 1.15 (continued)
Robust
Deﬁnition dF/dx Std. Err. zP   | z | x-bar 95% Conf. Interval
C. aevent Deﬁnition
COMRAT 0.0005594 0.0009588 0.58 0.561 26.2654 –0.00132 0.002439
CONRAT –0.0004993 0.0005171 –0.89 0.373 28.4811 –0.001513 0.000514
VARRAT –0.0002586 0.000949 –0.27 0.787 27.1044 –0.002119 0.001601
FDISTOCK –0.0029753 0.0012766 –2.27 0.023 3.16641 –0.005477 0.000473
SHORTTOT 0.0009613 0.0011325 0.91 0.363 15.9162 –0.001258 0.003181
PUBRAT 0.0012306 0.0008209 1.71 0.086 69.9671 –0.000378 0.00284
MULTIRAT –0.0006806 0.0006162 –1.21 0.227 19.7912 –0.001888 0.000527
DEBTY 0.0000792 0.0001567 0.51 0.613 53.3316 –0.000228 0.000386
RESERVEM –0.0000334 0.0000222 –1.57 0.115 412.677 –0.000077 0.00001
DEFRAT 0.0011607 0.0009477 1.19 0.233 4.61603 –0.000697 0.003018
DLCRED 0.0002325 0.0001554 1.85 0.064 25.8675 –0.000072 0.000537
DLY –0.0015439 0.0009927 –1.73 0.084 3.85051 –0.003489 0.000402
ISTAR 0.0001112 0.0019632 0.06 0.955 8.4883 –0.003737 0.003959
OVERVALN –0.0003815 0.0002373 –1.49 0.137 –5.18871 –0.000847 0.000084
TRADE –0.0010118 0.0003537 –2.52 0.012 47.1363 –0.001705 0.000318
GOVCON –0.0021182 0.0012636 –1.57 0.116 13.35 –0.004595 0.000358
CAD 0.0018845 0.0011319 1.62 0.105 3.64741 –0.000334 0.004103
obs. P 0.0748299
pred. P 0.0253162 (at  x-bar)
Number of obs. 588
Wald  2 (17) 64.52




COMRAT –0.000477 0.0006752 –0.72 0.472 24.5388 –0.0018 0.000846
CONRAT –0.0001558 0.0003666 –0.41 0.680 31.8778 –0.000874 0.000563
VARRAT 0.0003588 0.0006383 0.57 0.569 24.764 –0.000892 0.00161
FDISTOCK –0.0011275 0.0007419 –1.46 0.145 3.82585 –0.002582 0.000327
SHORTTOT 0.0000871 0.0007133 0.12 0.901 15.8634 –0.001311 0.001485
PUBRAT 0.0002927 0.0005123 0.63 0.529 69.6303 –0.000711 0.001297
MULTIRAT –0.0011583 0.0005954 –2.48 0.013 21.8597 –0.002325 8.6e–06
DEBTY 0.0001485 0.000146 1.05 0.295 45.5271 –0.000138 0.000435
RESERVEM –0.000016 0.0000162 –1.10 0.271 427.66 –0.000048 0.000016
DEFRAT 0.000573 0.0007951 0.71 0.476 4.27868 –0.000985 0.002131
DLCRED 0.0000761 0.000141 0.61 0.541 21.1944 –0.0002 0.000353
DLY –0.0013861 0.0008992 –1.99 0.046 4.62599 –0.003148 0.000376
ISTAR –0.0002626 0.0011823 –0.22 0.823 8.3681 –0.00258 0.002055
OVERVALN –0.0003454 0.0001643 –2.03 0.042 –4.5647 –0.000667 –0.000023
TRADE –0.0008508 0.0003236 –3.50 0.000 50.8592 –0.001485 –0.000217
GOVCON –0.0004142 0.0008319 –0.48 0.630 13.843 –0.002045 0.001216
CAD 0.001496 0.0009603 1.62 0.105 3.12759 –0.000386 0.003378
obs. P 0.0636792
pred. P 0.01217 (at  x-bar)
Number of obs. 424
Wald  2 (17) 44.63
Prob    2 0.0003
Pseudo R2 0.2642
Log-likelihood –73.926915
Notes: Probit estimates. The tests that the underlying coefﬁcient is 0 are z and P   | z |.regressions for our four crisis deﬁnitions are presented for a non-Africa
sample. As may be seen, when this is done, the estimated coeﬃcient of the
current account deﬁcit is positive and signiﬁcant either at the 5 or 10 per-
cent level. It is important to notice that what makes a diﬀerence here is
whether Africa is included in the sample. If instead of focusing on Africa I
use GDP per capita as the key variable to split the sample, as Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (2000) do, and I include only middle-income countries, the re-
sults are not as distinct as those reported in table 1.15.
The results presented above follow Frankel and Rose (1996) and control
for a number of variables, including the external debt ratio, capital ﬂows in
the form of FDI, and international reserves. A problem with including this
group of controls, however, is that it becomes diﬃcult to interpret the cur-
rent account coeﬃcient in the probit regressions. The reason for this is that
we are not allowing the current account deﬁcit to be ﬁnanced through the
traditional channels: an increase in indebtness or a reduction in interna-
tional reserves. In fact, in the results reported above, as well as in Frankel
and Rose (1996), higher account deﬁcits are being ﬁnanced exclusively by
an increase in non–debt-generating capital inﬂows. It is interesting to un-
derstand, however, if an increase in the current account deﬁcit that is ﬁ-
nanced by running up the debt or depleting international reserves increases
the probability of a crisis. The results in table 1.16, which were obtained
when both reserves and debt are not included as controls, show that an in-
crease in the current account deﬁcit ﬁnanced by traditional means indeed
increases the probability of an aevent type of crisis.28
As a ﬁnal exercise, and in order to analyze the robustness of these results,
I investigated whether they held under diﬀerent lag structures for the re-
gressors. In particular I considered the following structure: all debt vari-
ables were entered contemporaneously, as were the structural variables, and
the country performance and policy variables were entered with a one-
period lag. The results obtained indicate that when this alternative lag struc-
ture is used, the coeﬃcient of the current account deﬁcit remains positive
and signiﬁcant at conventional levels. When every regressor is entered with
one lag, the coeﬃcient of the current account deﬁcit remains positive and
signiﬁcant. In that case, however, some of the debt variables became non-
signiﬁcant.
To sum up, the results presented in this section suggest that the eﬀects of
larger current account deﬁcits on crisis depend on both the deﬁnition of a
crisis and on the regions of the world being covered. More speciﬁcally, the
results indicate that when the broader deﬁnitions acrisis and acrisis2 are
used, a higher current account deﬁcit increases the probability of crisis in
the larger sample. Higher current account deﬁcits also increase the proba-
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28. The results for an acrisis type of crisis are similar and are not reported here due to space
considerations.bility of aevent crises signiﬁcantly when the African nations are excluded
from the sample.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
The main question addressed in this paper is whether the current account
“matters.” If this question is interpreted very narrowly, in the sense that
countries with an arbitrarily deﬁned large current account deﬁcit almost in-
evitably face a crisis, then the answer is no. If, however, it is interpreted more
broadly, as suggesting that there are costs involved in running very large
deﬁcits, the research reported in this paper suggests that the answer is a
qualiﬁed yes.29
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Table 1.16 Crisis and the Current Account: Probit Estimates, Alternative Set of Controls
(Africa Excluded, 1970–92)
Robust
Aevent dF/dx Std. Err. zP   | z | x-bar 95% Conf. Interval
COMRAT –0.0000411 0.0008099 –0.05 0.960 26.3022 –0.001629 0.001546
CONRAT –0.0005226 0.000528 –0.93 0.354 28.4596 –0.001557 0.000512
VARRAT 0.000294 0.000864 0.34 0.731 27.1331 –0.001399 0.001988
FDISTOCK –0.0034274 0.0013471 –2.52 0.012 3.15382 –0.006068 –0.000787
SHORTTOT 0.0009178 0.0011867 0.81 0.417 15.9153 –0.001408 0.003244
PUBRAT 0.0012746 0.0008641 1.65 0.099 70.0393 –0.000419 0.002968
MULTIRAT –0.0007383 0.0006296 –1.27 0.202 19.7436 –0.001972 0.000496
DEFRAT 0.017021 0.000881 1.85 0.064 4.68826 –0.000025 0.003429
DLCRED 0.0002103 0.0001511 1.66 0.096 26.0009 –0.000086 0.000506
DLY –0.0018491 0.0010946 –1.87 0.062 3.83729 –0.003995 0.000296
ISTAR 0.0003013 0.0020829 0.14 0.885 8.48095 –0.003781 0.004384
OVERVALN –0.000391 0.0002352 –1.52 0.128 –5.48445 –0.000852 0.00007
TRADE –0.0010849 0.0003564 –2.56 0.011 47.1491 –0.001783 –0.000386
GOVCON –0.0019375 0.0012981 –1.43 0.153 13.455 –0.004482 0.000607
CAD 0.0024955 0.001186 2.09 0.037 3.71074 0.000171 0.00482
obs. P 0.0761421
pred. P 0.0279486 (at  x-bar)
Number of obs. 591
Wald  2 (17) 65.13
Prob    2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2198
Log-likelihood –124.15434
Notes: Excludes reserves and debt. Probit estimates. The tests that the underlying coefﬁcient is 0 are zand
P   | z |.
29. Naturally, a major challenge in this work is deﬁning what a “large” deﬁcit means. In the-
ory, “large” should mean “signiﬁcantly larger than the sustainable level.” In practice, however,
and as is shown in section 1.3 of this paper, existing sustainability models are not very useful,
especially in a dynamic environment. For this reason, in this paper I have deﬁned a “high
deﬁcit” arbitrarily, as a deﬁcit that for that year exceeds the 3rd quartile of the deﬁcit distribu-
tion for the region to which the country belongs.The analysis presented in this paper has shown that large current account
deﬁcits tend not to be persistent. Very few countries run large deﬁcits for
ﬁve years in a row, and only a handful have run large deﬁcits for ten years in
a row. As the analysis in section 1.4 of this paper suggests, the typical pat-
tern of current account deﬁcits is that countries that experience large im-
balances do so for a limited time; after a while, these imbalances are re-
duced, and a current account reversal is observed. In section 1.4 I analyzed
in detail the consequences, in terms of economic performance, of current
account reversals using a large (unbalanced) panel of countries for 1970–
97. Using recently developed econometric techniques, I found that, con-
trary to what has been recently suggested, reversals do have a negative eﬀect
on economic performance. They negatively aﬀect aggregate investment;
moreover, even when I control for investment, the regression analysis sug-
gests that reversals have a negative impact on GDP growth per capita.
In section 1.5 I addressed the narrower question of whether larger deﬁcits
increase the probability of a country experiencing a currency crisis. My re-
sults suggest that the answer to this question depends on the deﬁnition of a
crisis as well as on the sample used in the analysis. As the detailed explana-
tion in that section indicates, my results show that when Africa is ex-
cluded—and I argue that there are good reasons for doing so—an increase
in the deﬁcit raises the probability of a crisis, independently of how this
term is deﬁned. When the complete sample is used, higher deﬁcits increase
the probability of broadly deﬁned crises. They have no statistical eﬀect on
narrowly deﬁned crashes, however.
In sum, my conclusion is that, in spite of recent claims of the irrelevance
of current account deﬁcits, the evidence provides rather strong support for
the view that, from a policy perspective, large deﬁcits should be a cause for
concern. This does not mean, of course, that every large deﬁcit leads to a
crisis; nor does it mean that only when there is a large current account
deﬁcit can a crisis take place.
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Comment Alejandro M. Werner
This paper touches upon three issues. First, it comprehensively reviews the
evolution of the academic and policy makers’ views on the role of the cur-
rent account during the last twenty-ﬁve years. Second, it goes over models
of current account sustainability used in ﬁnancial institutions to argue that,
although these models provide certain information regarding sustainability,
they are useless to determine whether, at a particular point in time, a coun-
try is running large current account deﬁcits. Finally, the paper presents the
results from a huge data set on
1. The distribution of current account deﬁcits across time and across re-
gions.
2. The channels though which sudden stops aﬀect growth.
3. The relationship between current account deﬁcits and ﬁnancial crises.
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Alejandro M. Werner is director of economic studies at Bank of Mexico.Let me say that I am sympathetic to the idea that current accounts mat-
ter, and that I think the evidence presented in this paper shows this to be the
case and goes deeper into the channels through which this takes place. In
my comments, I will concentrate on two issues: ﬁrst, the empirical relevance
of the sustainability model presented in the paper, and second, the relation-
ship between current account reversals and crises.
Models of Current Account Sustainability
Given that the sustainable level of the current account should be deter-
mined by the willingness of the rest of the world to ﬁnance it, Edwards be-
gins from standard portfolio theory and derives the net demand for a coun-
try’s liabilities. This is a perfectly reasonable way to explain the determinants
of the sustainable level for the current account deﬁcit. However, to judge
whether this model provides a sensible order of magnitude for the sustain-
able current account deﬁcit in diﬀerent countries, Edwards uses the results
of a model developed by Goldman Sachs. He claims that,
Using a very similar framework to the one developed above, Goldman
Sachs has made a serious eﬀort to actually estimate long-run sustainable
current account deﬁcits for a number of countries (Ades and Kaune
1997)....  [T]he estimated levels . . . [range] from 1.9 to 4.5 percent of
GDP....  [A]lthough the range for the “Short-Run Sustainable Level”
is broader, in very few countries does it exceed 4 percent of GDP.
Although the Ades and Kaune model was also developed to calculate sus-
tainable current account deﬁcits, it is conceptually diﬀerent from the model
presented in Edwards’s paper. In the Ades and Kaune model, the net inter-
national demand for a country’s liabilities is not derived from a portfolio
model. When calculating this net demand, Ades and Kaune take into ac-
count a country’s incentives for defaulting on its debt. Therefore, the inter-
national net demand for a country’s liabilities is determined by the maximum
amount international capital markets can safely lend without triggering a
default. Thus, the stock of a country’s liabilities held by foreigners and the
sustainable current account deﬁcit will be determined by the equality be-
tween the beneﬁt of defaulting (and suﬀering the penalty of losing access to
the international capital market) and the beneﬁt of maintaining access to the
international capital market.
The literature that is closest to Edwards’ derivation of the sustainable cur-
rent account deﬁcit and that should be used to test the relevance of this
model is the one that tries to explain the equity home bias puzzle (see
French and Poterba 1991; Tesar and Werner 1998; Lewis 1999). In this lit-
erature, the international investor chooses the proportion of his or her
wealth that he or she wants to hold in domestic equity, and ﬁnds a demand
for domestic stocks equivalent to equation (4) in Edwards’s paper. When
these models are confronted with the evidence, the degree of diversiﬁcation
implied by them is much larger than that observed in the real world. Ac-
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cording to Lewis (1999, 578), “Clearly no degree of risk intolerance can jus-
tify such a low level of foreign portfolio allocation. Thus, these numbers
suggest the presence of home bias.”
These results imply that the portfolio diversification model predicts a
much larger demand for a country’s liabilities than the one observed in
practice. Thus, they also predict current account deficits larger than
those observed in the real world. Therefore, in addition to the problems
associated with the transitions related to changes in portfolio allocations,
it seems that these models also have important shortcomings in their im-
plications for the long-run sustainable level for the current account
deficit.
Empirical Issues
With respect to the empirical section, I will like to complement the pa-
per’s results on the relationship between current account reversals and cur-
rency crises with the Mexican experience. In particular, the Mexican crisis
of December 1994 clearly shows that the current account reversal took
place after the collapse of the currency. This supports the results of the pa-
per that show that the relationship between the current account and crises
implies complex timing issues.
As is clear from ﬁgure 1C.1, in 1994 Mexico suﬀered a capital account
Fig. 1C.1 Current and capital account balancesurplus reversal. In that year, the capital account balance went from a sur-
plus of 11.4 billion dollars in the ﬁrst quarter to –3.7 billion dollars in the
fourth quarter. As shown in ﬁgure 1C.1, the current account deﬁcit contin-
ued its downward trend during 1994. Obviously, domestic absorption was
cushioned from the correction in the capital account surplus by the foreign
reserve loses incurred by the central bank (see ﬁg. 1C.2). Once reserves were
depleted, the currency crisis ensued and the correction in the current ac-
count took place.
In conclusion, I think the paper is an important contribution to the liter-
ature and provides new and important evidence of the role that current ac-
count deﬁcits play in currency crises, and the channels through which large
current account reversals aﬀect growth.
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Fig. 1C.2 Capital account and international reservesDiscussion Summary
A few people made remarks on whether and why current accounts matter
for predicting crises. According to Jeﬀrey A. Frankel, it is important to dis-
tinguish whether the current account deﬁcit matters for causing currency
crises or for other things, such as long-term growth. As far as crises are con-
cerned, it is important to determine whether a current account deﬁcit is a
necessary or a suﬃcient condition, or, as the economic profession views it,
whether there is a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between current ac-
count deﬁcits and crises. Frankel commended the author for emphasizing
the diﬀerence between the isolated eﬀect of the current account on crises (in
a multivariate setting) and the eﬀect in a univariate regression.
Frankel made a couple of additional comments, oﬀering an insight on the
history of thought regarding the Lawson fallacy. The statement attributed
to Nigel Lawson is that the current account deﬁcit is not a cause for concern
if foreign borrowing goes to the private sector. Lawson later qualiﬁed this
statement, pointing out that this is not to say that high current account
deﬁcits will never lead to a crisis. According to Frankel, this qualiﬁcation is
a weak “straw man.” Frankel went on to comment on the paper’s approach
to identifying the impact of a sudden reversal of the current account on the
output growth rate. He said that a sudden reversal is most likely to take
the form of a reduction in investment. The author showed that, indeed, the
sudden reversal of the current account aﬀects the growth rate through this
channel.
Anne O. Kruegerdiscussed why and how the composition of a current ac-
count deﬁcit matters. She emphasized that the correct distinction is not be-
tween public and private uses of foreign capital, but rather of how eﬃciently
the money is spent. The former distinction is useless for a category as fun-
gible as the current account. She brought up the example of Brazil: When
Brazil increased its interest rates, the private sector responded by borrow-
ing from abroad while the public sector borrowed domestically. Krueger
questioned whether this made any diﬀerence. As for the matter of sustain-
ability, she stressed that the important diﬀerence is between rapidly grow-
ing countries excess demand for investment, and countries that have very
high investment rates in order to sustain some degree of growth without an
increase of productivity. For example, Korea had 10 percent of current ac-
count deﬁcit during its ten years of most rapid growth. She suggested that
the author ﬁnd variables to capture productivity in the study of current ac-
count. Later in the discussion, Jungho Yoo echoed Krueger’s comment on
how foreign savings (current account) are utilized.
Liliana Rojas-Suarez supported Krueger’s point. She said that a current
account should be understood as being on a sustainable path if the economy
is generating trade balances that enable it to avoid an ever-increasing accu-
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adjust economic activity severely. In this regard, the quality of investment is
extremely relevant. A current account deﬁcit that is basically the result of
highly productive investment is likely to be more sustainable than a current
account deﬁcit resulting from low saving. The reason is that highly produc-
tive investment increases the economy’s production capacity. Higher future
output, in turn, enables the economy to pay back its foreign liabilities. She
said that, in general, funding the current account deﬁcit with foreign direct
investment tends to help sustainability because FDI tends to go to produc-
tive investment projects, especially on the tradable goods sector.
Relating to the discussion of how the quality of investments aﬀects the
sustainable debt level, Michael P. Dooley agreed that, historically, what
countries do with the money seems to have been important. However, he
added, the conclusion might be the opposite of that implicit in the previous
paragraph: If defaulting on the external debt is a strategic decision, then the
better a debtor uses the capital inﬂow, the more independent the debtor be-
comes, and the more likely it will default.
That for which the current account deﬁcit matters was also discussed.
Jorge Braga de Macedo suggested that the paper could broaden the scope,
rather than limiting the discussion to emerging markets or adjustable pegs.
For example, he said that current accounts still matter within the euro zone.
Even if there will no longer be currency crises, there could still be debt or
banking crises in the euro zone. Jaume Ventura pointed out that the ques-
tion of how well current account deﬁcits predict crises is diﬀerent from the
conventional approach to its welfare consequences. In (intertemporal)
models of the current account, a large deﬁcit has no welfare costs and does
not ask for government intervention. Eduardo Borensztein commented on
whether current account deﬁcits could predict crises. He said that an IMF
study focusing on emerging markets (twenty-seven countries) found that
current account deﬁcits are very signiﬁcant predictors of crises. The some-
what weak result of the paper in this regard may suggest that the eﬀects of
current accounts diﬀer across diﬀerent groups of countries.
On the paper’s treatment (exclusion) of African countries, Braga de
Macedo disagreed with the author. He said that the devaluation in some
African countries in 1994 showed that Africa is just like any other region,
and that excluding these countries from the sample seemed unjustiﬁed.
Frankel said that, in his paper with Andrew Rose, he and Rose found no sig-
niﬁcant relationship between current accounts and crises in univariate re-
gressions. Edwards’ ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant correlation could be the result
of excluding African countries from the sample. Dooley supported this
point by citing his 1987 paper with Frankel and Don Mathieson, which
found that non-market borrowers (those who depend primarily on oﬃcial
ﬁnancing) have much larger and more persistent current account imbal-
ances. This, he said, could explain why the Edwards paper found diﬀerent
74 Sebastian Edwardsresults when dropping African countries. Krueger suggested the author
could include African countries but exclude the oﬃcial aid ﬂows to the re-
gion.
Martin Feldstein commended the paper’s emphasis on the transition be-
tween diﬀerent optimal stock levels of foreign capital. He said that this em-
phasis was very important because countries easily confuse the temporary
increase of capital ﬂows as a result of a shift in the desired stock level with a
sustainable higher level of current account ﬂow, as in the case of Mexico.
Ventura commented on the idea of sustainability, saying that transver-
sality conditions were introduced in the early models where the current
account was assumed to equal domestic saving. In these models, checking
sustainability simply means to conﬁrm empirically, the transversality con-
dition, which is a theoretical artifact. The approach of this paper, however,
is diﬀerent from that of the earlier literature in that the current accounts are
a result of portfolio choices. Ventura questioned the meaning of sustain-
ability in this new context.
Rudi Dornbusch said that the sudden-stop view would predict crises ﬁrst
and large current account reversals second. He suggested that the author
look into this relationship.
Krueger also expressed concerns about the data on diﬀerent forms of
capital ﬂows, such as equity and foreign direct investment. She said that the
use of derivatives is most likely to blur the distinction among such cat-
egories.
Kristin J. Forbes asked what the author’s view was on the (high) U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcit.
Regarding that for which the current account matters, Edwards said that
in the newer version of the paper, he had made it explicit. That is, large cur-
rent account deﬁcits do not unavoidably lead to catastrophic crises, but they
do, with high degree of likelihood, result in large welfare losses. He said that
the policy implication of the paper is very important. For example, there is
a heated discussion on whether the Mexican current account deﬁcit (about
4 percent) is too large. Should Mexico allow the exchange rate to depreci-
ate to handle that deﬁcit, or should it be left to ﬂoat and possibly lead to a
crisis? The concern of the paper is whether a large current account warrants
a policy intervention.
A related question is when to “apply the break,” as some countries (such
as Chile) use large account deﬁcits as targets for their monetary policies.
On the questions of the crowding out of foreign saving by domestic sav-
ing and on the use of saving, he said that the quality of investment could
possibly be proxied by interacting the deﬁcit and the competitiveness index
from the World Economic Index.
Finally, on the current high level of the U.S. current account, Edwards
said that no industrial country has had so high a level of current deﬁcit in
his data set, and that he believes this level is unsustainable.
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